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Following the collapse of communism in the 1990s in Central and South- Eastern Europe, the 
region has not only undergone a difficult period of economic and political transition, but also has 
witnessed the rise of ethno-nationalism in several states, along with problems of national identity, 
state formation  and the exclusion (or extermination as in the Yugoslav case) of minorities. 
Nationalism may adopt a variety of forms simultaneously - ethnic, cultural or civic, where either 
one of these forms or a mixture of elements from the three, may predominate in a state over time, 
influenced by politico-economic realities, elite behavior, party coalitions, international interests 
and ideological influences, as well as societal attitudes. Nationalism in its ethnic variant has led to 
the alienation and violation of minorities’ rights, and its supporters have advocated the creation of 
ethnically homogenous states. Proponents of cultural nationalism have attempted the assimilation 
of national minority ‘low cultures’ into the dominant national ‘high culture.’ On the other hand, 
civic nationalism has mobilized people in Eastern European states towards the common goals of 
democratization and protection of human rights (individual or group/minority rights). The 
concern over the spread of ethno-nationalism in various countries of the region has not been, as it 
is commonly argued, a result of the unleashing of historical primordial forces previously ‘frozen’ 
by communism, but rather has been invoked by political elites to fill an ideological vacuum or  to 
mobilize public support in times of political, economic or national identity crises in a quest for 
the conquest or preservation of political power (Anagnostou, 2005:90; Rupnik, 1996:10-16; 
Gagnon, 1994/95:131-132 ). These manipulative tendencies by elites have been less pronounced 
among the populace, especially in the case of Bulgaria, where anxieties over political 
democratization, the speed and consequences of economic market reforms, and guarantees of the 
protection of human rights, have all proved to be more pressing national concerns. As a Bulgarian 
scholar observes, ethnic animosities in Bulgaria in the beginning of the twenty first century 
“[have] diminished to such an extent that minority questions no longer represent a direct 
challenge to the new regime” (Vasilev, 2002:123).  Ethno-religious animosities during 
democratic transition were managed due to the existence of an already existing unified state, by 
the application of democratic ethno-pluralism, the positive evolution of societal attitudes towards 
the ethnic ‘other,’ along with a revision of historical ‘truths’ and mutual reconciliation. These 
were some of the factors that played a vital role in impeding a violent mobilization against the 
ethnic or religious ‘other.’   
 
Contrary to mainstream liberal accounts placing Eastern European countries under the common 
denominator of being exclusively ethnically divisive societies plagued by historically entrenched 
primordial divisions, the eruption of violent ethno-religious conflict in the former Yugoslavia was 
an exception rather than the rule in the region. This paper will argue that ethnic nationalism 
although present in some form, is not an eternally prevailing, historically and geographically 
fixed feature of all Eastern European countries, and the processes of remedying ethnic animosities 
during transition vary from country to country determined by diverse factors such as history, 
culture, national identity and domestic politics. This variation in unique ethnic conflict 
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management will be illustrated with the case of Bulgaria, which witnessed during its initial 
transition period (1989 -1991) the escalation of animosities between the country’s largest Muslim 
minority population and the national Bulgarian majority.  Nevertheless, ethnic differences were 
channeled for mediation in the political and social space, without resorting to violent means. 
Ethnic politics do not always represent a ‘ticking time bomb waiting to explode’ if they involve 
cooperation and compromise. Democratic ethno- pluralism was constructive in the Bulgarian case 
to fostering civic unity, while guaranteeing safeguards for ethnic identity and self- expression in 
various spheres (education, party politics and the media). During the country’s unstable transition 
period, democratic ethno-pluralism fostered the conditions for managing the initial escalation of 
ethnic tensions. 
 
This observation will be explored through the application of a detailed analysis of ethnic politics 
during democratic transition, with a focus on the largest minority in Bulgaria – the Muslims 
(consisting of Roma, Pomaks, Turks, Tatars and Circassians) - in the transition period of 1989-
1997. Bulgaria remains one of the exemplar cases in the region with the remedying of the 
country’s ethnic animosities through political party re-configurations, elite decisions, external 
influences, and the positive transformation of societal attitudes, proving that ethnic hatred is not 
fixed as a matter of historical continuity, but is susceptible to change and amelioration through 
democratic pluralist methods. The lack of escalation of violent ethnic conflict in Bulgaria can be 
also attributed to the absence of a “stateness” problem, which Linz and Stepan (1996) identify as 
a restraining factor during democratic transition. Bulgaria’s problem was a national-based one, 
requiring the search for and reformulation of national identity and the securing of minority rights. 
Second, the analysis will examine the successful management of ethnic animosities in Bulgaria 
in1989 - 1997, through an analysis of ethnic politics from liberation from Ottoman rule (1878) 
until 1989, as well as of key events that led to the weakening of ethnic cleavages after 1989. 
Among the themes explored are the weakness of nationalist parties, the creation and evolution of 
the Turkish/Muslim minority party - the Movement for Rights and Freedoms - as a third major 
political force and mediator, internal liberal and external European support for minority rights, 
and the positive evolution of societal perceptions towards the ethnic ‘other’.  
 
1.  Nationalism, National Identity and Democratic Ethno-pluralism: Conceptual and 
Theoretical Framework 
The roots and evolution of nationalism in Central and South-Eastern Europe can be traced to the 
early nineteenth century. Nationalism, a modern political ideology imported from the West, 
which first emerged among English Tudor aristocrats and later received major impulses from the 
French and American revolutions, as a form of challenging monarchical privilege and 
establishing democratic governance representative of citizens’ interests. Nationalism became 
influential and made its way into the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, with advances in 
social mobility - the efforts of traveling East European intellectuals or émigrés to European 
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countries influenced by the ideology on nationalism – and increased communication (Greenfeld, 
1995:19; Hroch, 1996:85-86). National consciousness and nationalism emerged prior to the 
formation of nation-states in the region, subjugated under imperial rule. Miroslav Hroch (1996) 
argues that an “exogenous ruling class dominated ethnic groups which occupied a compact 
territory but lacked their own nobility, political unity or continuous literary tradition” (p.80). 
Following the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman, Prussian and Austro-Hungarian empires 
under the impetus of national revolutionary movements, the revival of language and culture of 
subjugated nationalities, and favorable external influences, nationalism became the driving force 
behind the overthrowing of the “exogenous ruling class” and the crafting of the new nation-states 
in the region (Hroch, 1996:80-83; Berend, 1996:173).  
 
Nationalism is a contested concept and it continues to reappear in different forms. It has been 
analyzed as a plural “chameleon-like phenomenon, capable of assuming a variety of ideological 
forms” (Ozkirimli, 2000:61), as “diverse,” “fluid” and “protean” (Cockburn, 2000:613). 
Meanings of nationhood and ethnicity situated in such a fluid context may also vary. Nationalism 
cannot be defined separately, without understanding what nation, state and ethnicity are, which 
are not separate categories but mutually intersect in the constitution of nationalism, and account 
for its diverse forms of expression. There are various theories on nationalism and definitions on 
nationalism, nation and ethnicity.  
 
 Nationalism emerges with the idea of a nation. ‘Objective’ and ‘subjective’ approaches have 
produced diverging understandings of what a nation is. The ‘objective’ (or cultural) approach 
emphasizes the presence of common territory, language, historic fate, traditions or religion as 
constituent elements of nationhood. On the other hand, ‘subjective’ approaches identify a nation 
based on the presence of a common will, sentiment, imagination or belonging. Although useful, 
the two approaches have several limitations: ‘objective’ definitions tend to use broad national 
signifiers such as language or religion, which can apply to more than one nation (e.g. Germans 
and Austrians speak the same language, but are two separate nations); ‘subjective’ definitions are 
also broad and may encompass many cases such as regions, tribes or empires. (Smith, 2001:12)  
In reality, it is elements of both ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ approaches that define a nation.  The 
nation is neither a state characterized by Gellner (1983) as “an agency possessing the monopoly 
of legitimate violence” (3), with autonomous institutions and legal power over a particular 
territory, nor an ethnic community- defined as people sharing similar beliefs, language and 
customs. The nation is “a felt and lived human community…occupying a homeland, and having 
common myths and shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common 
rights and duties for all members” (Smith, 2001:13). The people constituting a nation possess a 
will for autonomy, national identity and express desire for self-determination (Ibid: pp.13-20). 
The feeling of identifying yourself with a nation and belonging to a nation (national 
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consciousness) is necessary, to have the emergence of nationalism as a unifying ideological 
movement.  
 
It is important to recognize, that there is a difference of opinion among scholars on nationalism in 
regards to the historical periodization and sequence of the rise of nations and nationalism. Smith 
(1991) for instance, argues that nations are founded on pre-modern ethnic cores. Thus, he 
perceives modern nations to have ancient roots (38-42).  On the other hand, Gellner (1983), a 
functionalist, asserts that nations and nationalism emerge with the coming of modernity and the 
rise of industrialization. His analysis relates the standardization of education, language and 
culture, the division of labor in industry, and the development of administrative and commercial 
structures to the rise of nationalism, and formation of nations (pp. 19-38; 50-52; 110-122; 137-
143). Gellner (1983) argues, that “it is nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other 
way around” (p.55). In sum, the rise of nations is either viewed to have occurred prior to 
modernity where nations formed around ethnic cores, or is perceived as a modern phenomenon 
that came about under the influence of nationalism and industrialization.  
 
In fact, both perspectives deserve merit. Relating these to the case of Bulgaria, it will be 
elaborated below, that in spite of the country’s political -economic domination by the Ottoman 
Empire and Greek cultural and linguistic influence, a Bulgarian nationality (rather than a nation 
in the modern sense) did exist prior to the rise of nationalism and the formation of an independent 
nation-state. Memories of former statehood (Bulgarian medieval state) stimulated the preservation 
of historical consciousness and national solidarity. For instance, monks in monasteries in the 
mountainous regions of Bulgaria were able to preserve through their works memories of 
statehood and signifiers of Bulgarian nationhood, such as language, history and culture. The rise 
of nationalism in the late 18th early 19th centuries, the founding of an independent Bulgarian 
Exarchy (1870), along with the revival of Bulgarian language and education by intellectual 
awakeners and the Church, were the crucial factors that strengthened national consciousness and 
stimulated a national revolutionary struggle that  led to the creation of an independent Bulgarian 
nation-state (Andreeva, 1998:84). Although the country industrialized at a much later stage, the 
spread of education and the popularization of the Bulgarian language and history by Church 
figures (i.e. monk Paisii Hilendarski) and intellectuals in all spheres of life, strengthened people’s 
sense of belonging to a nation (Ibid:84-86). Nationalism in the 19th century became the driving 
force in the national revolutionary struggles for liberation from imperial domination and the 
formation of independent nation-states.  
 
Nationalism is the process of devoting one’s interests to that of the political community (Kemp, 
1999:8).  Nationalism is an ideology that is solely focused on the nation and promotes its well-
being. The meaning of nationalism has several dimensions. Nationalism is a socio-political 
movement characterized by an emphasis on the revival of history, national folklore, literature, and 
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as Miroslav Hroch (1996) asserts, it is the first phase in the development of East European 
nationalism (p.81). Language and national symbols are also inseparable elements from 
nationalism, such as for instance the national anthem, the flag or names of national heroes. 
National symbols “serve to express, represent and reinforce the boundary definition of the nation 
and to unite the members inside through a common imagery and shared memories, myths and 
values” (Smith, 2001:8). Nationalism is “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining 
autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an 
actual or potential nation” (Ibid: 10). In addition, according to Gellner (1983), nationalism is also 
a “political principle,” with an emphasis on the unity of the political and national elements (p.1). 
In sum, nationalism is a “political principle” defined by aspirations for autonomy (the willingness 
to ground the national will through a state), common identity and unity, concerned with the 
national well-being. It is also an embodiment of common memories, expressed in national 
symbols and an attachment to traditions, language, culture and folklore. Nationalism is a 
mobilizing force and a “political principle” bringing together the “political unity and the national 
unity” (Rupnik, 1996:17).  
 
Nationalism may adopt various forms (has different faces), among the more prominent three 
variations being civic, ethnic and cultural. Civic nationalism is rooted in the civic conception of 
nationhood and is deemed to be the most inclusive of all types. Civic nationalism mobilizes 
members from diverse ethnic backgrounds that accept the prevailing national institutional and 
political framework of the state they occupy and enjoy equal access to political rights and all the 
‘cultural goods’ of the nation (Nielsen, 1999:121-122). Although theoretically civic nationalism 
constitutes an attachment to common political principles, in practice it may also necessitate the 
adoption of some cultural components by those who wish to become part of the civic nation. Such 
components may involve the ability to speak the official language, mandatory education in the 
official language, knowledge of the country’s history and some traditions. Nevertheless, in a civic 
nation, space is provided for the preservation of minorities’ languages and culture. When cultural 
nationalism prevails in a state, a privilege is placed on its culture, language, customs and heritage. 
Participation in this cultural project is required by all citizens, and at times the cultural (or 
religious) freedoms of national minorities might be curtailed if it is believed that they clash with 
the dominant culture (Ibid: 125-126). On the other hand, ethnic nationalism is exclusive, divisive, 
and defines membership in terms of common ancestry or a blood link. No matter how well one 
knows the language or adopts the cultural practices of the dominant group, they cannot become 
part of the group due to lack of common origin (Ibid: 121).  
 
As was the case in Bulgaria, nationalism in its civic form (capable of uniting diverse groups 
around common civic values) along with the introduction of ethno-pluralist methods for 
accommodating minority concerns, were constructive components for remedying ethnic tensions 
during democratic transition. Civic nationalism has provided the conditions - a stable political 
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unit, with a defined territory - for democracy to establish itself. The constructive role of civic 
nationalism in transition cannot be ignored or denounced. As Ghia Nodia (1992) rightfully asserts 
that it “…is the historical force that has provided the political units for democratic government” 
(p.7), and as Linz and Stepan (1996) argue, democracy is a system designed to govern a state, and 
without a stable and well-defined state structure consolidation of democracy is a challenging 
endeavour (p.7). Nationalism in its civic form may prove to be a useful for crafting a strong state 
structure and identity formation necessary for the successful transition to democracy and 
consolidation of civic nationhood (Nodia, 1992:3 – 6).   
 
A well-defined state structure (Linz & Stepan, 1996), consolidated civic national identity, along 
with ethnic or religious minorities toleration and rights via ethno-pluralist structures and 
guarantees, are essential ingredients to remedying ethno-religious tensions during democratic 
transition. On the other hand, the existence of nationality problems, minority oppression and 
assimilatory policies, as well as conflicting national identities can frustrate a democratic transition 
process. First, a “stateness” problem occurs when disagreements occur over the territory of a state 
and rights of citizenship (Linz & Stepan, 1996:16). In such a situation, a small ethnic or religious 
minority group within a state seeking some rights or self-determination might question the 
legitimacy of an oppressive state and express separatist demands. Consolidating democracy under 
such a condition is difficult (Ibid: 26). On the other hand, if the state is territorially well defined, 
tolerant and its legitimate boundaries are not challenged by the people comprising the state, then 
problems of “stateness” are unlikely to pose a threat to democratic transition. Even if “stateness” 
problems occur, they are likely to be resolved through legislation and decrees over a shorter 
period of time; whereas problems of national identity take longer time to resolve, as this involves 
peoples’ hearts and minds (Kuzio, 2001:175).  
 
Often, “stateness” is assumed to include nationality and state territoriality. As Taras Kuzio (2001) 
rightfully argues, a necessary distinction must be made between nationality (national identity) and 
“stateness”. He notes that despite the existence of a territorially unified state, cultural, linguistic 
and religious differences may complicate a democratic transition process (p.169). A common 
recognition of borders, the reconciliation of ethnic divisions, along with the creation of a strong 
civic national identity uniting diverse groups, is necessary for a successful democratization 
process.  
  
National identity can adopt three different forms, from which one can judge the complexities 
around transition. National identity contains civic, ethnic and cultural components. Civic identity 
includes “attachment to a common territory, citizenship, belief in the same political principles or 
ideology, respect for political institutions and enjoyment of equal political rights, and will to be a 
part of the nation”(Shulman, 2002: 558-559). Cultural identity is defined by language, religion 
and traditions, and ethnic identity is based on common ancestry and race. Civic identity proves to 
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be the most inclusive among the three types. Civic nationalism is non-assimilatory, does not 
require cultural uniformity, and is able to bind citizens into a larger community. On the other 
hand, the cultural conception of nationhood requires the adoption of the majority culture and the 
pursuit of assimilatory policies; whereas the ethnic concept of nationhood presupposes the 
favouring of a particular ethnic group’s culture and does not allow assimilation, which is deemed 
impossible (Shulman, 2002: 560-561). Thus, it is best for a democratic state to implement and 
promote civic values, around which groups with diverse cultural or ethnic identities can share and 
reconcile differences through ethno-pluralist means, while uniting around a common civic 
identity, as will be exemplified below was possible in the case of Bulgaria. 
 
Uniting diverse, historically rooted ethno-religious minorities around a common civic identity can 
be accomplished through the application of an ethno-pluralist democratic model. Ethno-pluralism 
is “a coherent policy model that goes beyond ad hoc arrangements and notions of minority rights. 
Its essence is to focus on all groups involved and to foster civic unity while safeguarding ethnic 
identities” (Karklins, 2000:219). State policies of ethnic homogenization, repression or neglect 
can become problematic and may lead to the escalation of tensions. As Arend Lijphart (1977) 
notes “because of the tenacity of primordial loyalties, any effort to eradicate them not only is 
quite unlikely to succeed, especially in the short run, but may well be counter-productive and may 
stimulate segmental cohesion and intersegmental violence rather than national cohesion” (p.24).  
On the other hand, the provision of a framework, which enables the preservation and fostering of 
minority rights and identities, can promote integration and national unity in the long run.  
 
In a pluralist democracy, state authority devolves to a plurality of groups. Contrary to proponents 
of liberal democratic theory, who recognize only the individual as the sole political actor in a 
liberal state, pluralists perceive associations to be the locus of guarantee of individual rights and 
an outlet for expression of diverse interests. Groups are more powerful than individuals in 
expressing demands towards the state, because they have more bargaining power to ensure the 
protection of individual or group rights and limit the possibilities for their abuse by the state 
(Karklins, 1994: 13-14). In a pluralist democracy, minority rights and identification no longer 
constitute individual private concerns, but become part of the public sphere. It is important for the 
state to take into consideration minority concerns, as the alternative may lead to the formation of 
reactionary forces challenging the authority of the state and expressing demands for territorial 
autonomy.  The interests of a historically rooted ethno-religious minority, as was the case with 
Bulgaria’s Muslim minorities, should be acknowledged, which are: 1.) political - concerned with 
participation in the political decision-making process; 2.) cultural – in regards to language policy 
or cultural associations;  or 3.) economic – dealing with inequitable distribution of resources 
affecting minority populated areas (Ibid:7). Minority groups may have separate schools, 
organizations and identities, while also sharing civic values, institutions and identity along with 
everyone else.  
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Ethno-pluralism perceives identities to be flexible rather than fixed, interacting with one another 
in a constructive manner towards civic unity (Karklins, 2000:220-222). “Rather than trying to 
melt ethno-cultural groups into a new cultural and political whole, a policy of ethno-pluralism 
affirms the distinctiveness of ethnic groups in order to bind them into a political whole” 
(Ibid:222). In a political system of power-sharing, multiple identities and interests are best 
accommodated through pluralist structures such as political coalitions, parties or interest groups, 
and by adherence to pluralist values of cooperation and compromise. Difference is seen to be 
inspiring rather than frightening, a bridge to a common civic unity (Karklins, 1994: 8-16). In sum, 
ethnic particularities are best addressed via an ethno-pluralist democratic model, which operates 
in a country with a lack of “stateness” problem, with the predominance of civic nationalism 
uniting everyone around a common civic identity, while at the same time ethno-pluralist 
structures ensure the representation of minority group interests and protection of rights. 
 
The existence of a unified state and the application of democratic ethno-pluralist politics were 
beneficial in remedying Bulgaria’s escalating ethnic tensions during democratic transition. As it 
will be explored below, in spite of instances in Bulgarian history of assimilation and violence 
directed against the country’s Muslim minorities - during the interwar years and communist rule - 
the application of ethno-pluralism in the post-communist period was productive in establishing to 
a certain extent a break with this uneasy past. Democratic ethno-pluralist methods such as 
political negotiation and compromise between various political and social groups were 
instrumental in managing escalating ethnic tensions during transition and facilitated the 
consolidation of national civic identities, while providing space for the preservation of ethnic and 
cultural identities. To be able to understand ethnic politics during democratic transition in 
Bulgaria, it is essential to consider the historical background of the problem, which can be 
divided into four major periods: 1.) Ottoman occupation and administration (1393-1878); 2.) 
national independence until the establishment of a communist regime  (1878 – 1947); 3.) 
communist rule (1947-1989); and  4.) post-communist period (1989- present). During each of 
these broad historical stages, it is important to examine ethnic relations and the evolution of 
Bulgarian nationalism, in order to be able to understand post-communist ethnic relations and 
political continuities or discontinuities. Various developments in ethnic relations and forms of 
nationalism were influenced internally by government policies and externally by Great Power 
interests, and after 1947 – by Cold War politics.  
 
2. Setting Bulgaria’s Ethnic problem: Overview of the History of Bulgarian Nationalism 
and Treatment of Bulgaria’s Muslim Minorities 
i. Bulgarian History and the Rise of Bulgarian Nationalism 
Efforts for the consolidation of the modern nation-states in the Balkan Peninsula began under the 
conditions of imperial domination. For about five centuries, Balkan nations were conquered and 
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ruled by the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires (Mancev, 1992:9). The Bulgarian nation fell under 
Ottoman domination in 1393, and the Bulgarian state ceased to exist. Prior to the Ottoman 
conquest, Bulgaria was a medieval state whose foundations were laid in 681 (the first Bulgarian 
state). The ethnic groups that comprised the medieval Bulgarian state were the proto-Bulgarians 
(coming from Asia Minor), Thracians and Slavs, which subsequently mingled over time to form 
the Bulgarian nation. The process of formation of a Bulgarian nation from ethnically diverse 
groups was solidified not only by conquest, intermarriage and combination of diverse cultural 
practices, but also with the establishment in 864 by Prince Boris I of Orthodox Christianity as the 
state’s religion. The Bulgarian medieval state was at its apogee in the 9th and early 10th centuries 
(See Appendix, Figure 1). Its vast territory stretched from the Adriatic to the Black Sea, marked 
by flourishing trade relations, culture, art, literature (the works of the monk Chernorizec Hrabr 
i.e. “Za Bukvite” – “About the Letters”) and legal codes written in the Cyrillic alphabet, founded 
by the monks Cyril and Methodius (Filipov, 2000:28-31; Crampton, 1997:10-24; Fowkes, 
2002:21). In the 10 century, the first Bulgarian state fell under Byzantine rule well until 1185. 
The second Bulgarian state was established in 1185 and lasted until 1393 (Crampton, 1997:24-
26). With the Ottoman conquest of Bulgaria and the Balkans in the 14th century, the Bulgarian 
state ceased to exist until the 19th century, but the statist tradition was preserved (Mancev, 
1999:20).  
 
The Balkan Peninsula, at the crossroads of civilizations, “a gateway between Europe, Asia, and 
Africa and the existence of a well-developed road system for carrying military, administrative, 
commercial, and cultural traffic since ancient times” was of vital interest to the Ottomans 
(Eminov, 2000:130). The Ottoman conquest of the region secured access to these key arteries. In 
closest proximity to the centre of Ottoman imperial rule and strategic trade routes (Bosporus and 
Dardanelles), Bulgaria was placed under direct Ottoman political and economic administration, 
subjected to the absolute authority of the Sultan and his administrators, while a relative degree of 
autonomy was provided to imperial subjects only in religious and cultural matters through the 
millet (religious nation) system.  The Empire was divided across religious and class lines. The 
“People of the Book” – Jews and Christians, were given the right to self-governance, pertaining 
only to religious and educational matters, and did not have to adhere to the Sharia (the body of 
Islamic legislation) (Bieber, 2000:14-15; Mancev, 1999:11).   
 
Although Christians and Jews were governed by separate religious authorities (Patriarchate in 
Constantinople for Orthodox Christians) and not the Sharia, their status was inferior to that of 
Muslims. This stratification based on the profession of faith determined the economic status of 
subjects and the applicability of particular laws. For example, only Muslims were allowed to 
serve in the army, and non-Muslims were subject to numerous taxes (i.e. cizye – poll tax), the 
most severe of which was considered to be the devshirme (child levy or also referred to by 
Bulgarian historians as “the blood tax”) - a separation of young boys from their families, who 
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became Muslim and were recruited in the Ottoman army (Janissary corps).  Society was also 
divided into classes. On the top of the hierarchy was the Sultan, followed by the state service 
(court scribes, soldiers etc.) recruited from members of the three recognized religions, traders 
(Ottoman and Bulgarian chorbadji), and the rest of society was considered as raya – the servants 
of the Sultan and his administrators (Bieber, 2000:14-15; Warhola & Boteva, 2003:257). Thus, 
the stratification of society in the Ottoman Empire according to religious affiliation, determining 
economic status and legal privileges (or lack thereof), led to the intertwining of religious and 
ethnic identification in the 19th century and consolidation of separate ethno-religious identities. 
 
This process was facilitated with the establishment of national Exarchates in the 19th century, 
independent from the Greek Patriarchate in Constantinople. This contributed to the strengthening 
of national consciousness and facilitated the penetration of religious institutions by nationalist 
ideologies from the West. Prior to the establishment of national Churches, non-Greek Orthodox 
people were subject to the Phanariot Greeks and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of 
Constantinople. Bulgarians in the Ottoman Empire were not only subject to the political and 
economic domination of the Ottomans, but also to Greek authority in religious, educational and 
cultural matters. Religious services and education were held in the Greek language. There was 
restriction on liturgies in Church Slavonic or education in the Bulgarian language (Poulton, 
2000:47; Sugar, 1996:19).  As the Czech historian Konstantin Irechek (1978) notes, the 
Hellenicisation process was so deep, that when asked, many Bulgarians identified themselves as 
Greek and were ashamed to call themselves Bulgarian (p.547). The beginning of the reversal of 
this process was set in motion in March 1870. Based on continuous pressure from Russia, and 
resistance from the patriarch in Constantinople, Sultan Abdulaziz (1861-1876) issued a ferman 
(decree) on this date, granting the creation of an independent Bulgarian Exarchate, with assigned 
dioceses from the Danube to the Balkan range (Sugar, 1996:25-26). The role of the Bulgarian 
Church and the works of intellectual awakeners such as monk Paisii Hilendarski with his “History 
of the Slavo-Bulgarians”(1762) (aiming to revive Bulgarian national consciousness and self-
esteem through emphasis on culture, language and the greatness of the medieval states and 
Bulgarian Church) and priest Stojko Vladislavov (Sofronii Vrachanski) considered as the founder 
of Bulgarian literary language (published Nedelnik – a volume of sermons and an autobiography 
– Zhitije i Stradanija Greshnovo Sofronija) were some of the major sources contributing to the 
revival of national identity in the 18th  and 19th centuries (Fowkes,1998:48; Mancev, 1999:25). 
According to the Bulgarian philosopher and sociologist Kiril Neshev (1997), the tradition of the 
inseparability of the Bulgarian Church from the process of national enlightenment and desire for 
independence begins with Paisii (p.76). Father Paisii, the first articulator of Bulgarian nationalism 
and revivalist of Bulgarian national consciousness urged the following in his History (See 
Appendix, Figure 2): 
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“So I wrote down for you what was known about your race and language. Read 
and know so that you would not be ridiculed and reproached by other tribes and 
peoples…I wrote it for you who love your people and Bulgarian homeland, and who 
like to know about your people and language…But there are those who do not care 
to know about their own Bulgarian people and turn to foreign ways and foreign 
tongue; and they do not care for their own Bulgarian language but learn to read and 
speak Greek and are ashamed to call themselves Bulgarians. O, you senseless fool! 
Why are you ashamed to call yourself Bulgarian and do not read and speak your 
language? Or had the Bulgarians no kingdom and state?...In the entire Slavic race 
the Bulgarians  have had the greatest glory, they first called themselves tsars, they 
first had a patriarch, they first became Christians, and they ruled over the largest 
territory…But why, you fool , should you be ashamed of your people and linger 
after a foreign tongue. …You, Bulgarian, so do not be deceived, but know your 
people and language, and learn your language!” (41-44). 
  
 Paisii’s History was an encouragement directed towards Bulgarians to be proud of their national 
origins and struggle against their inferiority complex (which Paisii transforms into pride). The 
book was also written for the purpose of the revival of language, culture, national and religious 
values (Todorova, 1995:75).  The Bulgarian Church became the “bridge to the political 
independence of Bulgarians” (Sugar, 1996:25) and the rise of nationalism. As Poulton (2000) 
observes: 
 
“The millet became established as the prime focus of identity outside of family and 
locality, bequeathing a legacy of confusion in modern times between concepts of 
citizenship, religion, and ethnicity. Furthermore, as the millet system placed control of 
education and much of the millet’s internal affairs in the hands of the millet hierarchy, and 
hence beyond official state control, it proved ideally suited to the transmission of the new 
ideology of nationalism intruding from the West” (p.47)  
 
Orthodox Christianity became the identifier of Bulgarian ethnic and national identity, and the 
Turk was identified with Islam. The religious and national elements intertwined in the struggle 
for national independence and affirmation of Bulgarian national consciousness (Tafradjiiski, 
Radoeva & Minev, 1992: 209-210). This lack of separation of the religious and national elements 
from the Ottoman period, carried over to the post-independence (1878) years, when the “faithful” 
and “giaur” (unfaithful) switched places. Memories of the experiences of Bulgarians under 
Ottoman rule were mixed. While relations in the Ottoman Empire between Bulgarian Christians 
and Muslims  might have been to a certain extent considered friendly and neighborly – 
“komshuluk,” there were also dark moments in the history of relations between the two groups, 
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contributing to mutual animosity and suspicion  (Mancev, 1992:35) .Some examples provided by 
Mancev (1992),  
 
“…with a lasting place in the national psychology of the Bulgarian, was the participation 
of Muslims in the quenching of the Bulgarian uprisings against the Ottoman rule. Best 
remembered along these lines were the bashi-bozuk carnages during the 1876 April 
Uprising: these atrocities deepened the gap between the Bulgarians and the Turks, found 
their place in the folklore literature, poetry and art, left a scar in the memory of the people, 
a scar of danger, animosity and historical guilt” (p.35).  
 
These mixed memories and experiences were to affect the Muslim minority in various ways after 
independence, depending on the form of nationalism that was predominant at particular point in 
time, which was influenced by external and internal political factors.  
 
Bulgarian nationalism adopted a variety of forms in the 18th and 19th centuries. Great Power 
interests in the region (especially Britain), as well as Bulgaria’s relations with neighboring 
Balkan states (in regards to territorial concessions from the collapsing Ottoman Empire) and 
internal political developments, were the configurations that determined the predominance of 
some forms of nationalism over others, and in turn affected internal government policies of 
assimilation or passive toleration of the country’s Muslim population. The key events, which 
determined the direction on the Bulgarian national question (the economic, political, territorial 
and cultural relations between nations; struggle for national emancipation and consolidation of an 
autonomous nation-state) were the establishment of an independent Exarchate (1870) and 
liberation from Ottoman rule; the treaty of San Stefano followed by the Berlin Congress dividing 
up Bulgarian territory (1878); the unification of the Kingdom of Bulgaria and East Rumelia 
(1885); proclamation of national independence (1908); the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the two 
World Wars (1914-1918;1939-1944) (Andreeva; 1998:46). During these historical stages, 
Bulgarian nationalism adopted several forms: 1.) anti-imperial, romantic and ethnic 2.) irredentist 
– aiming to unite lost territories (especially Macedonia and Southern Dobrudja) leading to the 
Balkan Wars and stimulating involvement in WWI 3.) revanchist and cultural nationalism (from 
WWI until the collapse of communism) and 4.) post-totalitarian nationalism – mixture of civic, 
ethnic and cultural forms (Daskalov, 1998:217- 223). A detailed exploration of these forms 
throughout Bulgarian history is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is essential to mention 
major occurrences, in order to understand how these influenced ethnic relations from 1878 to 
1997.  
 
Prior to independence in 1878, the Bulgarian national struggle was centered on liberation from 
Ottoman political and economic rule and Greek ecclesiastical domination (Andreeva, 1998:46-
47). During the years of national struggle and subsequent liberation with the intervention of the 
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Russian army in 1878, Bulgarian nationalism was romantic (aiming to revive a glorious past; 
emphasis on history, religion, language, folklore; origin and cultural cohesion was important 
rather than territory) and was an anti-imperial movement. Nationalism emerged in reaction to 
foreign domination, was romanticized, and thus solidified the Bulgarian national desire for an 
autonomous ethno-culturally cohesive nation-state. The national revival, the support of the 
Bulgarian Church, an educated middle class and secret national revolutionary committees formed 
in neighboring nations by émigré intellectuals influenced by the nationalist ideology (i.e. 
Belgrade - the legion of Georgi Rakovski; Bulgarian Central Committee in Bucharest – 
Karavelov and Levski) gave way to an organized armed revolutionary struggle for independence 
(Daskalov, 1998:200; 214; Sugar, 1996:25; Mancev, 1999:23).  During this period ethno-cultural 
nationalist traits were present, such as an emphasis on language, folklore, tradition, dress (the 
donning of the Turkish fez for the traditional Bulgarian kalpak, and Turkish scarf for Bulgarian 
scarf), composition of revolutionary poetry and press, and revival of memories of a heroic past to 
defeat present enemies (See Appendix, Figure 3) (Daskalov, 1998: 214-217).  
 
Following the gradual disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the 18th century and its 
transformation into the “sick man of Europe”, accompanied by a favorable international 
conjuncture (British-Russian cooperation), Bulgaria was liberated from Ottoman rule in 1878.  
Liberation was achieved with persistent and numerous national uprisings (although unsuccessful) 
and with the diplomatic and military intervention of Russia. At this point in time, with Russian 
aid, the San Stefano treaty was signed (March 3, 1878), which outlined the borders of the 
Bulgarian nation-state closely coinciding with the dioceses of the Exarchate and the ethno-
linguistic boundaries of the Bulgarian nation – from the Black Sea to Lake Ohrid and from the 
Danube to the Aegean (See Appendix, Figure 4) (Todorova, 1995:76). This territorial acquisition 
was to become the nationalist “dream” (Greater Bulgaria or San Stefano Bulgaria) for Bulgarians 
in later years and was to have implications for ethnic minority relations. This “dream” was 
shattered with the arbitrary imposition of the Berlin treaty by the Great Powers in 1878, which 
divided San Stefano territories, in fears of an increasing Russian influence to the South and 
economic access to the Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles). Bulgaria was divided into the 
Kingdom of Bulgaria and East Rumelia, and Macedonia and Thrace remained under Ottoman 
rule; Nish was given to Serbia and Dobrudja to Romania (Mancev, 1992:10-22; Todorova, 
1995:56).  
 
The Berlin Congress (1878) was to set another stage in Bulgarian nationalism, adopting an 
irredentist form, with the aim to attain lost territories populated by fellow nationals. Neighboring 
newly formed nation-states were also not satisfied with their territorial boundaries, and each one 
of them developed “megali” ideas (i.e. Greater Serbia or Greater Croatia), aiming to acquire 
territories populated with co-nationals, which were also ‘historically justified’ by the existence of 
medieval states. Following the first Balkan coalition war of 1912 against the Ottoman Empire, the 
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Second Balkan War of 1913 turned into a mutual strife for the division of the Ottoman legacy, 
where each party in the conflict sought to acquire ‘historically justified’ territory and realize their 
national dream. These objectives carried over to the First World War. Although Bulgaria lost and 
acquired some territories throughout this period, and afterwards during the Second World War, 
the dream of Greater Bulgaria was never achieved ( See Appendix, Figure 5) and the country was 
among the losers in all the wars that it engaged in (with the only exception of a victory in the 
Serb-Bulgarian war) (Daskalov, 1998:220-221).  
 
Following the Balkan Wars and the First World War, in a state of national collapse, Bulgarian 
nationalism transformed to revanchist and cultural one, in efforts for retaliation to national 
humiliation and territorial losses. This period witnessed an emphasis on cultural homogenization, 
the strengthening of state and educational institutions, highlighting the greatness of Bulgarian 
cultural heritage and history. Furthermore, the inter-war period witnessed instances of forced 
assimilation and Christianization of the country’s Muslim population (1912- 1913 and 1930s), in 
attempts to rid the country of any Turkish or Islamic presence (i.e. replacing of the fez for men 
and headscarves for women with Bulgarian hats kalpak and scarves). These assimilatory attempts 
were preceded by changes in the ideological climate in the country (liberal, conservative, agrarian 
or fascist) or in the international conjuncture.  During communism, nationalism was cultural, 
expressed in historical works, literature, through public events, sports etc. By adopting cultural 
nationalism, the government aimed to accomplish the cultural and ethnic homogenization of the 
population, necessary for reaching the goal of a desired socialist identity. Its culminating point 
was in the 1980s, with the forced “Bulgarization” and secularization attempts of all Muslims, in 
efforts to create a socialist society (Daskalov, 1998:221-223). Following the collapse of 
communism, various nationalist forms became influential in Bulgarian political and social space, 
ranging from ethnic, cultural and civic. Overall, these nationalisms had diverse impact on 
Bulgaria’s Muslim minorities.  
ii. History of the Treatment of the Muslim Minorities (1878-1989) 
The pre-communist and communist periods in Bulgarian history were characterized by instances 
of differential treatment or relative tolerance towards the country’s Muslim population, 
influenced by socio-political developments in the country, external relations, wars and political 
changes in neighboring Turkey. Bulgaria incorporates various ethnic and religious minorities, 
including Jews, Armenians, Russians, Walachians, Ukrainians, Macedonians, Greeks, and the 
largest minorities approximately accounting for more than 10% of the total population, Muslims 
(See Appendix, Figure 6) (Ivanov & Ilieva, 2005:1). The Muslim minorities include 
representatives of ethnic groups such as the Roma, Turks (with the exception of Christian Turks – 
Gagauz ), Tatars, Circassians as well as Bulgarian Muslims – referred to as ‘Pomaks’ (this term 
may have a negative connotation meaning ‘traitor,’ but here it will not be used in this pejorative 
sense). It is important to note, that it is difficult to establish accurately the number of 
representatives from each group, as some Roma, Tatars, Circassians and Pomaks tend to identify 
15 
 
themselves as Turk. According to the last 2001 Census of the Bulgarian Statistical Institute, the 
Turks in Bulgaria account for 746,664 of the total Bulgarian population (6 655,210), the Roma 
number 370,908, and the Pomaks, Tatars and Circassians are included in the total of the 
Bulgarian population (http://www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Census_e.htm). The number of people 
practicing Islam account for 966,978 of the total population.  
(http://www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Census_e.htm)   
 
Ethnic relations ranging from Bulgarian independence from Ottoman rule in 1878 until the 
consolidation of communist rule in 1944 are characterized by scholars as a mixture of closeness, 
neighborliness and toleration, or that of suspicion, hostility or even hatred (Zhelyaskova, 2001, 
284-285; Mancev, 1992:35-36). This observation of variance in intra-ethnic coexistence can be 
accounted to several factors, such as cultural similarities, country specific socio-political 
developments, as well as relations with Turkey and other states. The coexistence of Turks and 
other Muslim minorities with Bulgarians and other Christians in the Ottoman Empire was made 
possible due to the gradual “cultural hybridization” of these groups, and in other instances as of 
the evolution of a syncretic form of Islam intertwined with Christian tradition and some pagan 
rituals inherited from proto-orthodox people in the Balkans and pre-Islamic Turkish shamanism. 
The spread and adoption of a non-purist form of Islam (or folk Islam), and its intermixing with 
pagan and Christian traditions, reduced the likelihood of societal alienation of some Muslims who 
practiced this form of Islam, and secured their incorporation into the larger community 
(Zhelyaskova, 2001: 283-285). In addition, years of co-existence of different nationalities in the 
Ottoman empire have to a certain extent blurred distinctions between cultures and “[f]or the most 
part, Muslims and non-Muslims coexisted or periodically came into conflict as intimate neighbors 
with shared local identities and knowledge” (Neuburger, 2004:28). On the other hand, periods of 
hostility, hatred and assimilation of Muslims during and after the collapse of Ottoman rule, 
instigated by various Bulgarian governments were influenced by the volatile international 
conditions at the time (Balkan Wars and two World Wars) and changing political ideologies and 
national goals. During periods of government policies of assimilation of the Muslim minorities, 
emphasis was placed on: a) the revival of memories of Ottoman political and economic 
domination b.) the violent suppression of Bulgarian uprisings c.) the argument of the violent 
conversions to Islam of Bulgarians, a policy that was to affect mostly the Pomak population. 
These outbursts against the minorities often followed variations in Bulgarian nationalism in the 
process of consolidation of an independent nation-state, relations with Turkey and changes in the 
international conjuncture.  
 
Following the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, 
approximately 1 million Turks and other Muslims emigrated from Bulgaria. The population 
outflow continued during the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 and the two World Wars (Hopken, 
1997:55). The Turkish and other Muslim minorities (Tatars, Pomaks, Roma and Circassians) that 
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stayed in the country, consolidated their identities primarily around religion, and lived in closed 
and isolated rural communities (Ibid:56). This isolation of the Muslim minorities can be 
explained with the prevailing socio-political climate in the immediate post-independence period. 
Nationalism at the time was ethno-cultural, aiming to assert what is Bulgarian coupled by a 
pattern of modernization and “Westernization”, aiming to ‘wipe out’ any visible elements of the 
Ottoman past (i.e. by renaming towns bearing Turkish names, the transformation of mosques for 
non-religious purposes; transferring of Muslim cemeteries to the outskirts of towns etc.). As 
Wolfgang Hopken notes:  
 
“While this policy was more a result of the Bulgarian elite’s understanding of 
‘modernity’ and what a ‘European state’ should look like than a case of deliberate 
ethnic and religious discrimination, it nevertheless had an immediate impact on the 
living conditions of the Turkish and Muslim population, and on perceptions of their 
identity. It showed that they were now ‘aliens’ in the new state, which encouraged them 
either to emigrate or to ‘encapsulate’ themselves further within their religious group 
solidarity” (p.59) 
 
The Bulgarian elite in the immediate post-independence period and subsequently interwar period, 
overall, did not facilitate the integration of Muslim minorities into the rest of society. While 
Bulgarian governments during this period had to conform to international minority treaties under 
the auspices of the League of Nations, and ensure the provision of rights for Bulgaria’s 
minorities, in practice their attitude towards the Muslim minorities was passive. This passivity 
and negligence (economic, social and educational) on the part of Bulgaria’s governments, along 
with efforts for modernization and ‘wiping out’ of the country’s signifiers of the Orient, gradually 
contributed to the “encapsulation” of Muslims within their own communities. This process 
strengthened the Muslims’ religious identities and directed their sympathies towards Turkey 
(Mancev, 1992:40). Bulgarian state policies towards its Muslim minorities during the interwar 
years were characterized by double standards. On the one hand, there was 1) an official 
recognition of the Muslim population as a minority and 2) government compliance with 
obligations under international treaties for the treatment of minority populations (moved 
primarily by concerns for Bulgaria’s international standing, revisionist goals and the treatment of 
its fellow nationals on foreign territories). On the other hand, 1) the Bulgarian state made 
attempts by various means to decrease the Muslim population and encourage its emigration to 
Turkey and 2) lacked concrete state policies addressing educational matters and economic 
development in the regions populated by Muslims (Rhopdopean, Kurdjali and North-Eastern 
Bulgaria) (Ibid, 1992:36). The position of the Muslim population in Bulgaria was also on 
unstable grounds: first, it was a group which was associated with former Ottoman imperial rule; 
second, during the uncertain war period , Muslims were affected by the governments’ efforts to 
strike a delicate balance between the provision of minority rights and the protection of national 
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sovereignty and security; third, the Turkish minority’s close proximity to its country of origin 
was the reason for the difficulty of the Bulgarian state to  strike a balance between minority 
toleration and concerns for national security and territorial integrity (especially during the 1920s 
split within the Muslim community between Kemalists and anti-Kemalists) ( Stojanov, 1998:61-
62).  
 
In sum, Bulgaria complied by international treaties guaranteeing minority religious, cultural and 
educational autonomy, and incorporated provisions for safeguarding minority rights in the first 
Bulgarian constitution (1879-1947) and Bulgarian law. On the other hand, the elite’s 
preoccupation with modernization and Bulgarian ethno-cultural revival, while neglecting to a 
certain extent the Muslim minorities’ economic and educational needs, contributed to the latter 
group’s isolation from the rest of society and sawed the seeds for the formation of a separate 
ethno-religious identity. This merging of ethnic and religious identification was a continuity 
inherited from the Ottoman millet system, which the new Bulgarian state failed to revise. 
Governments in the interwar period continued to associate Muslim with Turk and Bulgarian with 
Christian. This tendency, along with government negligence towards the Muslim minorities, was 
sufficient to create some problems in the interwar period. 
 
The first Bulgarian Constitution (Turnovo Constitution) (1879-1947) guaranteed freedom of 
religion to adherents of other faiths, and declared Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the dominant 
state religion (articles 37-41). All ethno-religious minorities were granted Bulgarian citizenship 
rights, which were equal to these of ethnic Bulgarians (Articles 54 and 55; Bulgarski Konstitucii I 
Konstitucionni Proekti: 24-25). Muslims fought in the Bulgarian army for Bulgaria, as was in the 
case of the Serbo-Bulgarian war of 1885 and WWI. Several treaties between Bulgaria and Turkey 
subsequently granted autonomy to the Turks in Bulgaria. The Chief Mufti’s office, Religious 
Courts and the Mufti Vicarage dealt with the spiritual, administrative and judicial (inheritance 
and family law) affairs of Bulgarian Muslims up to the mid-1930s (where such were already 
eliminated in neighboring Kemalist Turkey). Mosques were tolerated, spiritual leaders were paid 
civil servant salaries and private schools inside the mosques were formed, although receiving 
irregular and limited financial support by the state. In addition, the printing and circulation of 
Turkish press was also tolerated (Zhelyaskova, 2001: 286-287; Hopken, 1997:56). Overall, these 
arrangements were accommodating for the Muslims and allowed for autonomy in religious and 
cultural matters. On the other hand, the duality in Bulgaria’s minority policy was evident in its 
neglect for the economic, educational and political integration of the Muslims.  
 
During the interwar period, the community was in an underdeveloped educational, political and 
economic state. In regards to educational policy, many ethnic Turks did not know Bulgarian and 
thus could not compete equally on the labor market (Zhelyaskova, 2001: 287). The illiteracy rate 
among Muslims was high, by the 1930s reaching 80.6% among men and 90.6% percent among 
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women (Statisticheski Godishnik na Tzarstvo Bulgarija, 1938:36). Private community schools 
were mostly funded by their members and donors, and the curriculum was with a religious 
orientation (Stojanov, 1998:70). The financial situation of schools was strained, receiving 
irregular and limited support from the state. For instance, per capita expenditure in 1907-1908 for 
a student in a Bulgarian school was 31.8 leva, and for a student in an Islamic school – 5.4 leva 
(Statistika na Obrazovanieto v Tzarstvo Bulgariya, 1911:224,250). Furthermore, teachers in 
Muslim schools were under-qualified, underpaid and could not receive government pensions 
(Stojanov, 1998:71). It should be noted that the Agrarian Government of Alexander Stamboliiski 
(1923) contributed somewhat to the educational advancement of the Muslim population, by 
increasing funding for private schools, the founding of a teacher’s college, and the introduction of 
a pension plan for private school teachers (Ibid:73). However, these efforts were short-lived and 
the general trend of limited education prevailed, thus contributing to a scarcity of intellectuals 
among Muslims.  In terms of political participation, as previously mentioned, there were 
representatives of the Muslim and Turkish communities in Parliament as members of Bulgarian 
parties, numbering no more than 20 in 1883 and no less than 4 in 1933. Nevertheless, they had 
limited room for ethnic bargaining in Bulgarian politics (Ibid: 66-67).  
 
In regards to economic development, economic stagnation was prevalent in areas with 
concentrated Muslim population, or in areas with mixed population. The state did not have a 
special program to address the economic underdevelopment of these regions, primarily Kurdjali 
(populated with Turks), Pomak populated areas in the Rhodopi Mountains and regions in North 
Eastern Bulgaria. As already mentioned, the Muslim population was primarily rural, dependent 
for its survival on agricultural production. Even this outlet for survival was blocked with the 
passing of a controversial Forestry Law in the Rhodopes, which gave the right to the state to lay a 
hand on all forests in the area. Administrators used this law to extract taxes and issue fines to 
members of the community attempting to use the land. Under conditions of permanent hunger 
and harassment by state administrators, many Muslims were driven to emigrate (Mancev, 
1992:37-38). Thus, while there was an official recognition of minority rights based on obligations 
under international or bilateral treaties with Turkey, as well as guarantees in the Bulgarian 
constitution, the policies of the Bulgarian state at the time were flawed, neglecting matters of 
education, economic development and practical socio-political integration of its Muslim 
population.  
 
The Bulgarian state was unable to strike a balance between efforts for integration of the Muslim 
minorities and the protection of national territorial integrity. Bulgarian governments’ policies in 
the interwar period were driven by irredentist and ethno-cultural nationalism, with the aim to re-
gain back lost territories populated by allegedly fellow nationals (i.e. Macedonia - nationality was 
determined based on linguistic and cultural commonalities) and rid Bulgaria of any remnants of 
the Ottoman past in efforts towards modernization and formation of a Bulgarian national identity. 
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Bulgaria’s ruling circles and population focus was on the Bulgarian minorities’ situation in 
Macedonia and Southern Dobrudja, and Bulgaria’s relations with Greece, Yugoslavia and 
Romania. The Turkish factor was not an immediate state priority and the Muslim minorities in 
Bulgaria were left on their own devices, while at the same time ensuring their confessional and 
cultural autonomy (Mancev, 1992:47). Overall, the Muslim minorities’ efforts were centered on 
the consolidation of a religious identity and they did not pursue any ethnic mobilization. In turn, 
the Bulgarian state respected these efforts and chose not to interfere in Muslim affairs, as long as 
they did not pose a threat in any way to national sovereignty and security (Hopken, 1997:61).  
 
State policies of relative toleration and instances of repression varied in the interwar period, 
where the latter were influenced by the liberation war (1878), the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), the 
First World War (1914-1918), the Kemalist revolution in Turkey (1919-1924) and the infiltration 
of Kemalist ideology among some of Bulgaria’s Muslims. For the most part, changes in 
Bulgaria’s domestic ideological orientation, as well as engagement in wars preceded occurrences 
of repression against Bulgaria’s Muslim population. The first instances of repression occurred 
during Bulgaria’s liberation war in 1878-1880. In this period, there were outward acts of violence 
engaging members of the two groups (Bulgarians and Muslims (mostly Turks) (Hopken, 
1997:58). From 1880 until 1912 the ethnic situation improved and clashes between the two 
communities were an exception. One such exception occurred in 1910 around a private affair in 
the town of Rousse, where a Bulgarian Christian bank clerk had persuaded a Muslim girl to 
convert to Christianity so they could both enter into marriage. The affair was blown out of 
proportions, and resulted in the involvement of public officials, members of parliament and 
citizens. Clashes around this issue led to the injury and death of 70 people (Stojanov, 1998:74-
75). Nevertheless, ethno-religious co-existence remained relatively peaceful until the First Balkan 
War.  
 
During the Balkan Wars of 1912 - 1913 violence recurred. The Bulgarian conquest of Thrace was 
accompanied by severe repression against the Muslim population living there. The violence 
committed was in a way an expression of resentment and revenge for past Ottoman atrocities in 
the Balkans. Villages were burned; mosques were transformed into churches, soldiers raped 
women, and mutilated bodies prior to murdering them. In the mean time, about 220,000 Pomaks 
in Thrace, Macedonia and the Rhodope Mountains were forcefully Christianized, renamed and 
forbidden to wear religious clothing (See Appendix, Figure 7) (Stojanov, 1998:77; Neuburger, 
2004:41). As Neuberger (2004) notes, “Islam (unlike Judaism for example) continued to be 
conceptualized as a false and illegitimate presence, brutally imposed by Ottoman overlords on 
essentially Bulgarian souls” (p.40). This perception was reinforced by Bulgarian ethnographers 
like Stoiou Shishkov (1914) who argued that Pomaks (or what he called Bulgaro-Mohammedans) 
in Bulgaria spoke the purest form of Bulgarian with old Slavic words, and thus they were the 
purest Bulgarians. On the other hand, he presents arguments, derived from observations of Pomak 
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Turco-Arabic features in clothing and customs that Pomaks were forcibly Islamized by the 
Ottomans, and were thus Turkified (p.3) (See Appendix, Figure 8). Here one can vividly see the 
continuation of the trend in post-Ottoman Bulgaria of merging religious and ethnic identities and 
the reminder of historic tragedies to justify ethno-nationalist goals. During the First Balkan War 
of 1912 “official actions reified academic notions (i.e. Stoiou Shishkov)” (Neuburger, 2004:41). 
While instances of forceful conversion during Ottoman rule were not unheard of, alternative 
possibilities of conversion to Islam were not considered, whether they were either a matter of 
personal choice, or motivated by economic and social status reasons, escape from religious 
persecution (i.e. Bogomils were considered by the Orthodox Church as heretics and were widely 
persecuted) or other factors (Eminov, 1997:32-45).  
 
Following a military disaster for Bulgaria, the campaign of forced Christianization of Pomaks 
was reversed in 1913, by the liberal interim regime of Vasil Radoslavov. Pomaks were allowed to 
return to Islam, wear religious clothing, and to reclaim their old names.  This policy reversal was 
a strategic move to gain Muslim votes in an upcoming election and to earn the favor of the 
Ottoman Empire and Austro-German Central Powers. The explosion of the First World War in 
1914 necessitated the Bulgarian government’s rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire, as to be 
able to pursue an alliance with the Austro-German Central Powers in an effort to re-gain lost San 
Stefano territories (Neuburger, 2004:42). Following a defeat in WWI, the Agrarian government 
of Stamboliiski (1919-1923) pursued an isolationist, anti-irredentist, anti-war policy of 
rapprochement with Balkan neighbors and the Great Powers. In addition, Stamboliiski’s domestic 
policy involved the affirmation of national culture through the Bulgarian village. Stamboliiski 
incorporated both Muslims and Christians in his effort to transform Bulgaria to a peasant state 
and rid it from what he considered the foreign influence and corruption of the cities (Crampton, 
1992:151; Neuberger, 2004:44). Ethnic relations in the immediate post - WWI period were calm, 
and the Bulgarian state pursued a policy of non-interference in the affairs of the Muslim 
minorities.  
 
This situation changed in Bulgaria in the late 1920s, which was influenced by domestic politics 
and by the Kemalist Revolution and proclamation of a secular Turkish republic (29 November, 
1923). The Kemalist revolution strengthened Turk national identity and removed all religious 
elements in the public sphere and life of citizens. Some of the changes included the elimination of 
the Sharia courts and religious education (1925); the adoption of the Swiss Public Codes (1926); 
the separation of religion from the state (1928); the introduction of the Gregorian calendar and 
substitution of the Persian-Arabic alphabet with the Latin one (1928); mandatory education 
(1931) and universal suffrage (1934) (Stojanov, 1998:81). In Bulgaria, following the 
assassination of Stamboliiski (1923), nationalist and centrist democratic parties formed 
subsequent new governments (Democratic Accord 1923-1926; Democratic Party 1926-1931; 
Popular Bloc 1931-1934; Military quasi-fascist authoritarian government – Zveno 1934-35; Boris 
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III authoritarian rule – 1935-1944). Bulgarian politicians during this period were preoccupied 
with containing the activities of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) 
and persecution of members of the Communist Party (Pantev, 1996:15-16). In 1923-1944, 
Kemalism was associated by the various Bulgarian governments with communism, and 
government elites viewed Kemalism as a potential threat to Bulgaria’s territorial integrity 
(especially in Southern Bulgaria) (Neuburger, 2004:45).   
 
Part of Kemalist Turkey’s policy at the time was to attract fellow nationals living in foreign lands. 
Kemalism found grounds for expression in Bulgaria among urban Turkish teachers and 
intellectuals, particularly in the North-Eastern towns of Varna and Shumen. Kemalist supporters 
founded the youth sports and cultural organization Turan (1926), which was a union of Turkish 
cultural, educational and gymnastics sports societies, with centre in Sofia, aiming to spread the 
nationalist ideology among its members. Until its 1936 ban, the organization was actively 
functioning. The Muslim community was split between Kemalist modernizers with a Turkish 
national consciousness in the process of formation, and those who adhered to religious principles 
and held firm to their religious rather than ethnic identities (the majority of the population). In the 
late 1920s, the government launched active support for anti-Kemalist forces within the Turkish 
and Muslim communities, and organizations such as Rodina (Pomak organization). Rodina 
sought to strengthen the Bulgarian identity of Pomaks and emphasized the need of modernization 
in the community (See Appendix, Figure 9). Modernizing attempts initiated by Pomaks were 
tolerated by the state, but such were discouraged among the Turks. Anti-Kemalist refugees were 
also granted residence in Bulgaria. The aim of the Bulgarian state was to uproot disseminators of 
the Turkish nationalist ideology, to maintain the religious (rather than national) identification of 
Bulgarian Turks and encourage the strengthening of Bulgarian identity among the Pomaks 
(through the support of Rodina) (Hopken, 1997:61-62, Stojanov, 1998:82- 84).  
 
Anti-Kemalist efforts intensified in 1934, with the coming to power of the authoritarian military 
government of Kimon Georgiev. Frustrated from numerous failed attempts of persuading the 
international community to revise the 1919 peace settlement and improve the situation of 
Bulgarian minorities in Macedonia, Dobrudja and Thrace, Bulgarian society and political circles 
were penetrated by defensive ethno-nationalism. A special directorate for ‘social renewal’ was 
created to stimulate the revival of culture the increase in art and publications. Nationalist 
organizations became involved in the political process and spread anti-Muslim and anti-Turkish 
prejudice. The state became actively involved in persecuting Kemalist supporters and in the 
banning of organizations associated with the spread of Turkish nationalism, such as Turan. In the 
meantime, the state encouraged the flourishing of religious publications, conferences and 
activities among Bulgaria’s anti-Kemalist Muslims. The Bulgarian government also promoted the 
activities of the anti-Kemalist organization – the Society for the Defense of the Muslim Religion, 
established in 1934. Teachers/ government informants were placed in Muslim schools to monitor 
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the rest of the staff for Kemalist influences over students. Religious education and activities were 
encouraged only to curb the spread of Kemalist nationalist propaganda, and serve Bulgarian 
nationalist goals (Crampton, 1992:163; Stojanov, 1998:86-87; Hopken, 1997:62-63).  
 
Overall, the Bulgarian governments in the 1930s and 1940s did not tolerate the rights of Muslim 
minorities, and did not pass any policies to improve their economic and educational situation. On 
the contrary, the Bulgarian state in this period pursued an active policy of discrimination, name 
changing campaigns (1930, 1942), encouraged mass emigrations to Turkey, reduced the number 
of Muslim schools and newspapers (except for the newspaper Medeniyet - the mouthpiece of the 
Society for the Defense of the Muslim Religion and Hakikat sahidi – a Christian outreach 
magazine), and the number of Muslim parliamentarians or public officials significantly decreased. 
A deliberate policy was launched to slow down the educational development of Muslims. 
Illiteracy was seen to sever ties with Turkey and Kemalism, and intellectual advancement was 
perceived to have the opposite effect – to strengthen Muslim ties with Turkey and threaten 
Bulgarian national integrity. Fascist groups constantly harassed members of the community. 
Economic opportunities were also limited. Many Muslims emigrated during this period to 
Turkey, through the active encouragement of the Turkish state, and glad tidings from the 
Bulgarian state (Stojanov, 1998: 88-90; Poulton, 2000:49).  
 
Overall, the Bulgarian state in the interwar period pursued policies of assimilation and repression 
of Turkish and other Muslim minorities, encouraged their emigration, while providing grounds 
for religious autonomy (stipulated by international treaties). Bulgarian governments’ policies 
towards the Muslim population during the post-liberation and interwar period varied between 
assimilation and repression or passive tolerance. Periods of discrimination were preceded by 
wars, internal political changes or influenced by relations with Turkey. The Bulgarian state did 
little to stimulate the cultural, economic and educational development of the Muslim minorities. 
The Muslim community was left on its own devices (except during the period of Agrarian rule), 
and its isolation from the rest of society was the result of state passivity.  The Bulgarian elite did 
not pursue attempts for reconciliation to overcome the distance between Bulgarian Muslims, 
Turks and Bulgarian Christians. The Bulgarian governments’ policies initially contributed to the 
strengthening of Muslim religious identity, and later on pursued assimilatory policies attempting 
to destroy it. Assimilation rather than integration was the preferred policy of the 1930s. This 
tendency carried over the Cold War period, with variation in policy and ideological orientation.  
 
In 1944 communist rule was established, and in 1946 the regime became totalitarian. Soviet 
political, economic and social models were imported and implemented without taking into 
consideration national particularities. Religion, considered as the ‘opium of the masses,’ was 
banned and atheistic propaganda was spread to Christians, Muslims, Jews and Armenian- 
Gregorians. The Bulgarian Communist Party tried to eradicate religious identities in general and 
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Islamic identity in particular. Instead, the Party enhanced the development of a Turkish national 
identity and a secular identity among Muslims, by improving the material conditions of members 
of the community and restoring their Muslim names. The communist government believed that by 
improving the lifestyle and material conditions (base) of the Muslim population, they would 
stimulate the development of a socialist consciousness (superstructure). According to the BCP, 
Muslim consciousness and vestiges of the Ottoman past were obstacles on the way to socialist 
progress and formation of a socialist consciousness (Neuburger, 2004:56-58; Poulton, 2000:49). 
Thus, during the communist period, efforts were made by the Party to encourage the development 
of socialist consciousness by enhancing national identities, secularism and modernization among 
Turks and Muslims in a way that did not threaten Bulgarian national integrity and security.  From 
the late 1950s the Party attempted to gradually weaken Turkish national identity, and by the 
1980s pursued a policy of assimilation in efforts to eliminate it completely (Hopken, 1997:64; 
Eminov, 2000:140). A level of cultural expression among ethnic groups was allowed only within 
the framework of the communist ideology of proletarian internationalism. The communist policy 
of respecting Turkish culture and supporting cultural development was influenced ideologically 
based on the assumption that the communist revolution can be exported to Turkey and the rest of 
the Muslim world with the help of a new secularized Turkish intelligentsia (Ragaru, 2001: 295; 
Warhola & Boteva, 2003:261).  
 
In contrast to the interwar governments’ deliberate educational stagnation and enhancement of 
religious identity among the Muslim minorities, in 1946 - 1956 the Bulgarian Communist Party 
sought to strengthen secular identities among Turks and Muslims, and invested efforts and 
finances to educate the members of the community. The government implemented a sort of 
affirmative action policy, granting Muslims privileged entry in university without entrance 
exams, and provided them with opportunities for professional advancement. The Party stimulated 
the cultural development of Turks and other Muslims, established secondary schools for Turks 
and Pomaks, theatres, libraries and pedagogical institutes, which improved the qualifications of 
teachers in Turkish and other Muslim schools. All these efforts contributed to the development of 
a secular Turkish and Muslim intelligentsia, loyal to the Party and regime, and led to the 
consolidation of separate ethnic identities (Eminov, 2000:140-141). 
 
The BCP encouraged the secularization of Turks and Muslims, at the expense of curtailing 
religious rights. The Dimitrov Constitution of 1947, and the 1971 Constitution, provided legal 
guarantees of freedom of conscience and religion, but in practice these were violated. For 
example article 53 of the 1971 Constitution stipulates that “citizens have freedom of conscience 
and religion, and rights to perform religious rituals or to engage in anti-religious propaganda”; 
article 35 (2) states that “no privileges or limitation of rights based on nationality, origin, creed, 
sex, race education and social and material status is allowed” and forbids the (4) “the propagation 
of hate or humiliation of the person because of race, national or religious affiliation” (Bulgarski 
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Konstitucii i Konstitucionni Proekti , 1990:65, 63). In practice, the opposite occurred, and 
religious freedoms were curtailed not only of Muslims, but also all of other religious 
communities. Quranic classes were banned. Religious schools (Medresse) were closed down, 
minority private schools were eliminated, and the educational activities were transferred to public 
schools where part of the curriculum still contained the teaching of  the Turkish language, but 
subjects were introduced that would facilitate the assimilation of Turks into Bulgarian society.  
(Zhelyaskova, 2001: 287-288). In addition, the observance of religious holidays and rituals was 
prohibited, as well as the wearing of religious attire or symbols (i.e. shalvari and feredje for 
women and fez or prayer hats for men). The justification behind such actions was based on the 
following: 
 
1) Islam had an alien presence in Bulgaria, which was imposed on Bulgarians by 
force, who were as a result Turkified and have lost their Bulgarian 
consciousness 
2) Foreign reactionaries from abroad (i.e. Turkey) have been using Islam to 
spread ‘bourgeois nationalism and religious fanaticism’ (considering Cold 
War tensions, Turkey’s membership in NATO, shared border with Bulgaria 
and close territorial proximity of the Turkish minority to Turkey) 
3) Islam impeded the assimilation of Turks and Muslims into the Bulgarian 
socialist nation and Muslim bit (life style) was an obstacle on the way to 
socialist progress and modernization (Eminov, 1997: 52-53; Neuburger, 
2004:58).  
      
To certain extent, the BCP succeeded in their efforts to secularize a fraction of the Muslim 
population, especially the Pomaks. However, attempts for the complete eradication of religious 
identity were not successful. The Party inadvertently contributed to the strengthening of Turkish 
national consciousness, and members of the Muslim community managed to preserve their 
customs and steadfastness in religious observance. By the 1950s, the BCP arrived at the 
realization that by strengthening ethnic identities they undermined the main socialist goal – the 
amalgamation of various ethnic groups into a single socialist nation, sharing a universal language, 
culture etc. The BCP was in need to reverse its policy and began to gradually eradicate ethnic 
identities or encourage emigration to Turkey. In 1950, during massive government land 
collectivization campaigns, about 150,000 Turks emigrated to Turkey. This population outflow 
continued until the 1970s. As Warhola and Boteva (2003) note, despite the friction that this 
emigration caused between the Turkish and Bulgarian governments, in a way “it served as a 
social and political “safety valve” that kept potential ethnic-based conflict inside Bulgaria within 
manageable proportions” (p.262).  The communist government gradual process of minority 
assimilation intensified after the 1958 Party Plenum. The government realized that it could not 
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destroy gradually and completely minority religious and cultural identity and thus had to intensify 
this effort (Eminov, 2000:141). 
 
Following the 1958 Plenum, the Bulgarian Communist Party declared “war on all manifestations 
of nationalism and religious fanaticism among the local Turks” and the so-called “Rebirth 
Process” was implemented in full force aiming to eradicate not only Muslim religious but also 
Turkish ethnic identity. Ethnic and national differences had to be eliminated, on the road to the 
consolidation of a universal socialist identity (Zhelyaskova: 288). The BCP, adopting cultural 
nationalism, pursued a Bulgarization campaign, aiming to assimilate Turkish and other Muslim 
minorities into the Bulgarian nation. The peak years of assimilation were in the 1970s and 1980s, 
when the Bulgarian communist regime experienced a legitimacy crisis (Vasilev, 2002: 105; 
Ragaru, 2001: 295).  
 
There were several foreign policy and country-specific motivations behind the BCP’s pursuit of 
assimilation and repression against Muslims. On the international front, the strain in relations 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, and persistent Cold War tensions heightened the 
BCP’s sensitivity to Bulgarian national security issues. In addition US support for Turkey and 
Greece, the Kosovar riots of 1981 and Muslim/non-Muslim tensions in Yugoslavia, the Turkish 
participation in the Korean War and joining of NATO forces in 1951, as well as the partition of 
Cyprus in 1975, all led to the BCP’s increasing prioritization on national territorial integrity 
(containing Turkish irredentist nationalism directed towards Bulgaria’s Turkish minority in 
Southern Bulgaria) and security (Neuburger, 2004:66-67, 71). Some of the major factors that 
pressed the BCP to pursue assimilation were: 1) demographics – allegedly declining number of 
Bulgarian population and increasing number of Turks and other Muslims; 2) diverting national 
attention from a persisting economic crisis; 3) increasing affinities of Pomaks and Roma towards 
Turkey and Bulgarian government fears of minorities’ demands for territorial autonomy; 4) rising 
devotion to the fundamentals of Islam among Muslims; and 5) destabilizing factors such as the 
bombings of the Varna and Plovdiv train stations in 1984 (Neuburger, 2004: 79; Eminov, 
1997:92). 
 
The first Communist Party attacks were launched against the Muslim Roma in the 1950s. Their 
theatres and press were shut down and their names were forcibly changed (Zhelyaskova, 2001: 
288). In the 1960s, a total assimilation campaign was launched against Bulgarian and Turkish 
Muslims, who, according to official party rhetoric (echoing such during the interwar years based 
on ethnographic studies), were Bulgarians who were forcibly “Islamized” and “Turkified” during 
the Ottoman period and were now willing to restore their true Bulgarian identity (Ragaru, 2001: 
295; Eminov, 2000:141).  Turkish schools, media and theatres were closed down; the use of 
Turkish was banned in public communication along with religious clothing, festivals, rituals and 
music. The field of Turkish Philology in Sofia University was eliminated; Muslim graveyards 
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were destroyed and even the names of the deceased were changed; burial ceremonies had to be 
conducted in a new socialist way; and the circumcision of boys was prohibited. Those who dared 
to speak Turkish in public or parents who circumcised their sons, were fined by the state police 
(see Appendix, Figure 10) (Helsinki Watch, 1986:10-15) Only the Muslim Muftiship was 
allowed to exist, with Chief and regional Muftis appointed based on their loyalty to the regime.  
The assimilatory policy culminated with the forced name change of Pomaks in 1972-1974, and of 
Turks in 1984 -1985. The campaign was conducted by the government through propaganda and 
violence, and those who resisted adopting Christian Bulgarian names were sent to labor camps or 
imprisoned (Zhelyaskova, 2001: 288-289; Eminov, 1997:61).  
 
The so called “Rebirth Process” further eroded relations between Muslims and Christians, and 
was countered with the eruption of massive protests in1989 against the government’s campaign. 
These protests started in Northeastern and Southern Bulgaria, where the Turks and other Muslims 
began to demand the restoration of their names, respect for their human rights and called for the 
establishment of a multi-party system (RFE/RL 27 June, 1989:5). They were joined in support by 
dissident and human rights groups (union Podkrepa and the Discussion Group for Glasnost and 
Perestroika) in the capital Sofia, which were also opposed to the regime. Clashes with the army 
and the police resulted in several casualties. Consequently, the same year, Todor Zhivkov, the 
country’s top communist leader, announced on radio and public television the opening of the 
border with Turkey and granted the right to “those who did not feel Bulgarian” to leave Bulgaria . 
Zhivkov maintained that “there are no Turks in Bulgaria” and that “the Islamized Bulgarian 
population has not come from outside.” He accused “foreign forces” and “certain Western circles 
and radio stations of conducting a slanderous campaign against Bulgaria”, as well as Turkish 
“circles [that] harbored the hope that they could turn the wheel of history back, to the times of the 
Ottoman Empire” (RFE/RL, January, 1990:9-10; RFE/RL 27 June, 1989:7-8).  This period, what 
was euphemistically called by the government as “the Grand Excursion,” witnessed “the largest 
movement of people since the Second World War” – 350,000 ethnic Turks left the country, 
leaving behind their homes and possessions (Helsinki Watch Report, 1989:1).  
 
The BCP’s initial secularization attempts until the 1950s, and the launching of the so called 
“Rebirth Process” after the 1958 Plenum, failed to destroy Muslim religious and Turkish ethnic 
identities. The assimilatory policies strengthened, rather than weakened, minority religious and 
ethnic identification and further undermined the government’s legitimacy and ability to bind all 
Muslims around a socialist identity. Facing such a crisis, in order to alleviate ethnic tensions, the 
only way out for the BCP was to actively encourage emigration to Turkey or pursue assimilation. 
The mass emigration of Turks and other Muslims from Bulgaria to Turkey caused economic 
dislocations. The country lost a much needed labor hand in the tobacco industry in the Southeast, 
construction, transportation, livestock breeding, and wheat agriculture in the Northeast of the 
country. Factories in ethnically mixed areas were facing closure and crops were not harvested due 
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to the lack of labor. Economic stagnation and other factors, led to the ouster of Zhivkov from 
power on 10 November, 1989. The new reform Communist leaders came to power by the means 
of a parliamentary coup, and removed the former dictator from government (RFE/RL, 5 January, 
1990:7-10). The new reform communist government of the former Foreign Affairs Minister Petar 
Mladenov reversed the policy of assimilation on 29 December, 1989, and promised the protection 
of the rights of the Turkish and other Muslim minorities in the country (RFE/RL 9 February, 
1990:5). Nevertheless, the collapse of the regime was already set in motion. 
   
In sum, Bulgaria’s historical record (1878-1989) of treatment towards its Muslim population 
varied between that of passive tolerance or assimilation, hostility and hatred. The treatment of 
Muslim minorities differed, influenced by several factors such as country- specific political 
regime changes and ideological orientations determining prevailing forms of nationalism, foreign 
policy and international influences, as well as the Balkan Wars and two World Wars. Following 
the disintegration of the communist system in 1989 and the increase in socio-economic and 
political uncertainties during regime change, Bulgaria witnessed a brief period of escalating 
ethnic tensions (1989-1992). One may have expected the historical inevitability of an ethnic 
conflict, but on the contrary such was remedied through skillful ethnopluralist democratic 
politics, such as the formation of political coalitions, the integration of the Muslim minorities in 
the political process with the formation of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, and the 
application of pluralist values throughout transition, such as negotiation and compromise. In 
addition, the political mobilization of people around a civic conception of nationhood, and 
citizens’ respect for civil rights and faith in a democratic system and institutions were essential to 
overcoming ethnic divisions.  
 
3. The collapse of communism, the national identity crisis and the initial handling of the 
ethno-nationalist backlash (1989-1992) 
Bulgaria’s elite-pacted transition from communism did not face a “stateness” problem, as the 
country had an already existing unified state. Rather, it experienced a Bulgarian national identity 
crisis and a “nationness” problem, which may have prolonged the transition to democracy. 
Bulgaria and what it meant to be a Bulgarian, as well as Bulgarian history were in need of re-
examination and re-constitution. Eager Bulgarian Western-oriented elites began a process of 
disassociation from their “Oriental” and communist past, and strove to establish a close 
relationship with the West. Most Bulgarians were in a process of re-examining their identities, 
drifting between Western and Bulgarian cultural influences. The presence of the Turkish minority 
and followers of Islam in the country, a religion and country which Bulgarians for centuries past 
have associated with economic backwardness and historical occupation, strengthened this 
disassociation from the “other”, especially through the continuous dwelling on “national 
tragedies”. This process, which has proved to be politically detrimental at times in the Balkans, 
has been referred to as “transferred manners in historical perception.” It is a process of 
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construction of enemies and allies through the presentation of a historic “pain list,” through which 
a nation aims to bring out its quality and uniqueness in comparison to other nations, and to shape 
in this way a nation’s identity (Ozge, 2002:52). ‘Bulgarianness’ was, and to a certain extent still 
is, emphasized through the searching for and demeaning of the foreign “other,” while not 
necessarily being clear on what it means to be a Bulgarian. As Ozge (2002) notes, “the negative 
perception of national consciousness has paved the way for an appreciation of one’s own history, 
origin, culture and people while, at the same time, rendering the other as valueless” (p.54).   
 
Inter-ethnic animosities in the country escalated in the initial transition period (1989-1992) to 
democracy, with society and politicians being divided on Bulgaria’s national question. Bulgarian 
national identity was in crisis and the only way to assert its uniqueness was through the 
continuous reminder of historical pains and the existence of the foreign “other” within the nation.  
This ‘othering’ process occurred, because previous governments and intellectuals failed to 
separate ethnic and religious identification. Belonging to a particular ethnic group meant that one 
belonged to a particular religion, and visa versa (i.e. Pomaks were ethnic Bulgarians and therefore 
could not possibly be Muslim or a Muslim was a Turk and nothing else). State repressive and 
assimilatory policies stimulated the consolidation of separate Turkish and Muslim identities, as 
well as Bulgarian/Christian identities, and thus led to the formation of distinct group solidarities 
(Hopken, 1997:71). However, the fear from the imposition of another authoritarian regime 
necessitated the unification of representatives from diverse ethnic and religious groups around a 
common civic identity. Everyone sought the common goals of democratization, respect for 
human rights for all Bulgarian citizens, socio-economic and political reform, and European 
integration (Warhola & Boteva, 2003:268). This primary concern of overcoming any 
authoritarian pledges to political rule strengthened the necessity for resolving the country’s 
Muslim minorities’ problem and national identity question, through ethnopluralist democratic 
means.  
 
As the analysis above shows, Bulgaria had a historical record of ethnic tensions and government 
policy of repression, assimilation and expulsion of its Muslim population. Instances of ethnic 
tensions were also accompanied by the predominance of various forms of nationalism – anti-
imperial, irredentist, revanchist, ethnic or cultural. Following the disintegration of the communist 
regime, one would have predicted the inevitability of violent ethnic conflict. In spite of such 
common expectations for conflict, based on observations of escalating tensions in the beginning 
of the transition period, the opposite occurred.  Ethnic cleavages were ameliorated by channeling 
differences in the democratic pluralist political process. Priority was placed on the greater ‘evil’ – 
the elimination of the threat of another tyrannical regime (keeping in mind that Communist Party 
representatives still had powerful influence in Bulgarian politics during transition), rather than the 
lesser ‘evil’ (to become more pronounced after the establishment of a Parliamentary democracy) 
– the participation of representatives from the Muslim community in Parliament in an organized 
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political movement. The remedying of ethnic conflict took place on two related levels: 1) 
political/foreign relations - based on official political policies and practices and external 
influences 2) social level – based on relations among groups (Warhola & Boteva, 2003: 265). On 
the first level, the factors that determined the improvement of ethnic relations were political party 
re-configurations; the possibility for Muslim minority political mobilization and Parliamentary 
representation; the absence of violent retribution attempts by the Turkish and other Muslim 
minorities for past injustices; and external EU pressures for respect of minorities’ rights. On the 
second level, the positive gradual evolution of societal attitudes towards the ethnic ‘other’ 
(Bulgarian, Turk, Roma, Pomak etc.) were key to ameliorating ethnic cleavages.  
 
Following the gradual collapse of the Bulgarian communist regime (1989), political elites became 
preoccupied not only with resolving problems around political-economic reform, but also with 
the painful national question, especially in the face of an ethno-nationalist backlash in 1989-1992. 
Many Bulgarians, especially urban intellectuals perceived the so-called “Rebirth Process” to be a 
dark and shameful period in the country’s history, brought about by the former regime’s 
chauvinism. In the face of a collapsing communist regime, along with a level of support by ethnic 
Bulgarian human rights groups and other organizations (i.e. Podkrepa, Human Rights Committee 
in Bulgaria, Society for the Protection of Human Rights), the Turkish and Muslim minorities 
staged mass protests and hunger strikes in May, 1989 demanding the restoration of their Turkish 
or Muslim names and the release of prisoners convicted for their opposition to the assimilation 
campaign (Helsinki Watch Report, 1989:39-45). The Muslim community’s protests were planned 
to coincide with the opening of the Paris CSCE Human Rights Meeting, and attract the attention 
of the international community. In a matter of days, they spread across Turkish and other Muslim 
populated areas, and the demonstrators carried banners which demanded the following: “We want 
our real names,” “We want to speak our language,” and “We want to practice our religion freely.” 
The authorities suppressed the protests by sending the police and the army. The army and the 
police surrounded villages with tanks and used force against the protestors (Ibid: 7-8). Facing 
domestic unrest, protests by newly organized groups, and international pressures (Turkey, the 
West and even countries in the Soviet bloc), as previously mentioned, on December 29, 1989 the 
new reform communist government passed a policy that reversed the assimilation campaign and 
allowed for the restoration of Turkish/Arabic names (RFE/RL 9 February, 1990:5).  
 
This sudden policy reversal witnessed the eruption of nationalist counter-protests in January 1990 
that began in Kurdzhali (a region concentrated with Turkish and other Muslim population), and 
spread to other ethnically mixed areas and major cities such as Sofia, Plovdiv, Ruse, Shoumen, 
Turgovishte etc (RFE/RL 9 February, 1990:7).  Nationalist groups and parties were formed, such 
as the Bulgarian National Radical Party and the Fatherland Party of Labor, which raised slogans 
calling “Bulgaria for the Bulgarians,” “No to Turkish Separatism,” “Bulgaria is not Cyprus” and 
“Turks go to Turkey.” They set up a Committee for the Defense of National Interests (CDNI) in 
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the district of Kurdzhali. The Committee accused the minority Turkish population of pursuing 
territorial separatism, denounced the new policy decision of the Communist Party as 
undemocratic without due regard for the opinion of the Bulgarian population, and called for a 
national referendum on the national question. The political climate in the country was further 
destabilized by the nationalists, who played with public fears by claiming that Turkey, a NATO 
member, was aspiring to invade Bulgaria and was to attempt the “Cyprusization”  (territorial 
partition of Turkish populated from Bulgarian populated areas) of the country. These nationalist 
protests evoked the counter-mobilization of Bulgarian human rights groups and organizations 
(Stamatov, 2000:555-556; Vasilev, 106-107; RFE/RL 9 February, 1990:7-8). 
 
The ethno-nationalist protests were contained as a result of the formation of social and political 
alliances and the introduction of new legislation aimed at resolving the country’s national 
question. This initial political compromise became possible due to lack of a “stateness” problem 
and the pursuit of negotiations by various groups. The reform communist government still in 
power in the period of transition, along with the newly emerged major democratic opposition - 
the United Democratic Forces (UDF), the human and cultural rights national movement - the 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms representing the Turkish/Muslim minorities, labor unions 
and 65 other organizations, allied in opposition to the CDNI’s demands for a referendum. In 
addition, the Grand Mufti Nedim Genchev presented a declaration issued on January 11 by the 
Supreme Muslim Theological Council, which denounced nationalist provocations and accusations 
that Muslims were aspiring to obtain regional autonomy or sought the territorial partition of the 
country, and expressed a firm recognition of the unity of the Bulgarian state and support for 
retaining Bulgarian as the sole official language of the country (RFE/RL 9 February, 1990: 4; 7-
10).  
 
The Public Council on the National Question was formed in January 1990, with representatives 
from the government, political parties, and independent groups and associations. As a result of 
the political compromise and resolution that the Council produced, the first wave of nationalist 
strikes and protests nation-wide subsided. The Council publicly condemned the “Rebirth Process” 
pursued by the former regime as being a dark period plagued by minority human rights 
violations, and at the same time strongly expressed their opposition to minority separatism and 
separatist organizations threatening the territorial unity of the country and affirmed Bulgarian to 
be the sole official language of the country. In fact, when a number of moderate nationalist 
representatives were interviewed such as Mincho Minchev and Rosa Simeonova, they stressed 
their support for democratic pluralism and the rule of law, and stated that their main criticism was 
that the BCP’s December 29 decision was taken behind closed doors without any public 
consultation. They also stated that they were in support of granting basic human rights to Turkish 
and other Muslim minorities (RFE/RL 9 February, 1990:9)  A declaration of compromise was 
adopted by Parliament (Declaration on the National Question) on January 15, 1990 promising the 
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restoration of Turkish and Muslim names, rights and religious freedoms, while at the same time 
prohibiting any Turkish or Muslim minorities’ demands for territorial autonomy, outlawing 
autonomist groups, the public display of the Turkish flag, and providing security guarantees for 
Bulgarians living in ethnically mixed areas. In addition, amnesty was granted to all ethnic Turks 
jailed since 1984 during the “Rebirth Process.” Furthermore, a Parliamentary commission on the 
national question was set up with representatives from ethno-political movements and the United 
Democratic Forces. The commission drafted a Law on the names of Bulgarian citizens, which 
was later adopted by Parliament on 5 May, 1990, allowing for the restoration of names and rights 
to homes and property of Bulgarian citizens who wished to return from Turkey (Tafradjiski, 
Radoeva & Minev, 1992:217; Karasimeonov: 3; RFE/RL 9 February, 1990:9-10).  
 
Thus, during the first wave of nationalist protests, a political compromise was reached on the 
national question between representatives from the Muslim community, various political parties 
and nationalist organizations. This compromise was possible due to the preoccupation of the 
reform communist with building for themselves a good international political image, especially in 
the eyes of the European Community, as well as their realization of the destabilizing effect of an 
ethnic conflict on their regime. Nationalist groups were disturbed by the BCP’s unilateral 29 
December policy decision, without consulting Bulgarian citizens or giving them a chance to voice 
their concerns. In addition, the Turkish and other Muslim ethno-religious minorities did not have 
any separatist goals, but rather demanded respect for their human rights and cultural autonomy, 
recognized the territorial unity of the Bulgarian state, and did not insist on the adoption of 
Turkish as a second official language of the country. All parties in the deliberation process were 
in support of democratic pluralism and the rule of law. The political institutionalization of the 
Turkish and other Muslim minorities’ agenda into the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, the 
MRF’s moderate nationalism (going as far as demanding the restoration of Turkish cultural, 
language and education rights, freedom of Muslim religious practice, and restoration of names) as 
well as the formation of the Council on the National Question in opposition to the CDNI, were 
two initial decisive socio-political moves that determined the absence of a violent ethno-religious 
conflict in the country during the initial transition period (RFE/RL, May 31, 1991:5-7). Thus, the 
channeling of differences to the political process, the absence of instigation of violent clashes by 
either side involved in the verbal conflict, and their ability to reach compromise on the national 
question, were among the key factors that alleviated ethnic tensions. 
 
Despite the success of these preliminary ethnopluralist political endeavors in fostering a 
compromise, coupled with granting of political representation space for the Muslim/Turkish 
minorities through the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) with 24 deputies being elected 
in the first general elections in 1990 to sit in the Grand National Assembly, the nationalist turmoil 
in the country did not recede. On 12 July 1991, the new post-communist Bulgarian Constitution 
was adopted, guaranteeing some rights to minority groups, with certain limits, which nationalist 
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groupings used to their advantage to stir up national debates (AL/BGR/93.001:8-9). The 
Bulgarian Constitution affirms the territorial integrity of the Bulgarian state and states that “no 
autonomous territorial formations shall exist” (article 2.1). Article 5 (4) stipulates that any 
international instruments, in this case related to minority rights, are “considered part of the 
domestic legislation of the country” and “shall supersede any domestic legislation of the country” 
(i.e. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; International Convention on the 
Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination (1965); European Convention on Human 
Rights (1950); Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities).  
 
The Constitution guarantees cultural rights and freedom from discrimination for ethnic and 
religious groups, but does not explicitly recognize collective minority rights, and prohibits 
collective political rights. The Constitution’s focus is on individual rights. Article 6 recognizes 
that all individuals are “born free and equal in dignity and rights”, and that “there shall be no 
privileges, or restriction of rights on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnic self-identity, sex, 
origin, religion, education, opinion, political affiliation, personal or social status or property 
status.” Articles 13 (1) and 37 (1) guarantee the freedom of conscience and practice of any 
religion, as long as such do not pose threat to public order, the rights and freedoms of others, or to 
national security. Article 29 (1) states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhumane or degrading treatment, or to forcible assimilation.” Furthermore, article 36 (2) of the 
Constitution also guarantees citizens whose “mother tongue is not Bulgarian,” “the right to study 
and use their own language alongside the compulsory study of the Bulgarian language.” In terms 
of cultural rights, article 54 (1) states that “everyone shall have the right to avail himself of the 
national and universal human cultural values and to develop his own culture in accordance with 
his ethnic self-identification.” On the other hand, the Constitution limits collective political rights 
with article 11 (4), stating that “there shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial or religious 
basis, nor parties that seek the violent seizure of state power,” and “no organization shall act to 
the detriment of the country’s sovereignty and national integrity, or the unity of the nation, nor 
shall it incite racial, national, ethnic or religious enmity or an encroachment on the rights and 
freedoms of citizens.”  
 
In October, 1991, article 11 (4) of the Constitution provided the nationalists, with legal grounds 
to continue their further attacks on the MRF and the Turkish and other Muslim minorities in the 
country. Nationalist organizations and deputies in the Grand National Assembly argued that the 
MRF was an ethnic-based party, with a chairman (Ahmed Dogan) and constituency of Turkish 
and Muslim descent. They argued that the MRF constituted a threat to the territorial integrity and 
security of the Bulgarian state guaranteed by the Constitution. Ninety three members of the 
National Assembly - most affiliated with the former Communist Party – requested from the 
Constitutional Court, which by law is required to “rule on challenges to the constitutionality of 
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political parties” (article 149.5), to declare the unconstitutionality of the MRF (Ganev, 2004:69-
72). 
 
During the decision process, the justices were divided between those who gave greater priority to 
national territorial integrity, and others who placed emphasis on the need for democratic 
pluralism. The final decision was based on numerous factors, some of which were: the 
interpretation of article 11 in its broader constitutional context (referring to democratic 
pluralism); the inability of the justices to agree on a precise definition of the broad phrase “ethnic, 
racial or religious basis;” and the conclusion that although the MRF program included reference 
to Muslim membership, it did not explicitly set barriers to ethnic Bulgarians willing to join the 
party. Thus, the MRF was allowed to register as an official party, the nationalists’ petition was 
rejected by the Constitutional Court in 21 April, 1992, and the constitutionality of the MRF was 
affirmed. It should be noted, that during this conflict, the nationalists sought legal rather than 
violent means to resolve what they understood to be their national problem, and based their 
grievances on Constitutional provisions. On the other hand, the decision by the Constitutional 
Court not to ban the MRF was a turning point in the history of ethnic politics, where the contrary 
might have led to tragic consequences for ethnic relations in the country (Ganev, 2004: 72-84).  
 
In response to the Court’s decision, nationalist parties, among the most vocal ones being the 
Bulgarian Nationalist Radical Party and the Fatherland Party of Labor, threatened to form a “civil 
parliament” and pledged to wage a “life or death” struggle against the introduction of Turkish 
language classes in the Bulgarian curriculum, and vigorously resisted the participation of MRF 
deputies in the Bulgarian Parliament and the existence of the party (Vasilev, 2002: 110-111). 
They even went as far as to form an “independent republic” in the city of Razgrad, which 
threatened to declare autonomy from Bulgaria and possibly join Greece (Ibid: 109)! Nevertheless, 
politically the nationalists did not enjoy mass support in the country, where for instance the 
BNRP in the 1990 general elections obtained 1.5% of the votes, the FPL obtained only one seat 
in Parliament and 2 seats in the elections of 1993 due to their alliance with the BSP, and the 
Bulgarian National Democratic Party remained invisible in the political spectrum up until 1997, 
when it acquired 0.16% of the votes (Ragaru, 2001: 300). 
 
Regardless of this weak political standing of nationalist parties in Bulgaria, public attitudes 
remained negative towards Turks and other Muslims. According to a sociological statistical 
inquiry conducted in 1991, about 51.1% of Bulgarians viewed the Turks as “an actual threat to 
national security” (versus 21.5% for Pomaks and 36.2% for Roma) and 83.8% of Christians 
replied that the Turks were “religious fanatics.” In regards to attitudes towards the “Revival 
Process,” 35.5% thought that it was “necessary for the achievement of the unity of the Bulgarian 
nation,” and 56.2% claimed that “descendents of Turkified Bulgarians should be helped to 
rediscover their Bulgarian conscience;” 60% rejected the way that the assimilatory policies were 
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applied, but approved of the goals they aimed to achieve (Ragaru, 2001: 300). According to a 
different sociological study conducted during the same year (consisting of interviews of 160 high 
school and university students (138 Bulgarians, 12 Turks, 4 Pomaks and 4 unidentified), 85% of 
the interviewed Bulgarians thought that Turks were religious fanatics, 52% replied that they were 
cruel, 47% saw that they were isolated in their own community, 33% thought that they were rich 
and also hard working. More negative stereotypes were expressed towards the Roma: 89% of 
respondents considered this group as robbers, 87% thought of them as being dirty and ignorant, 
83% - careless, 80%- having bad manners, 76% - being trouble makers, 70% - having lice, 68% - 
lazy, 64% - with musical talents etc.  In terms of what each group (Turkish and Bulgarian) 
thought of themselves and the other, resulted in the overvaluation of one’s own group in 
comparison to the other (Note: the author of the survey recognizes the limited number of Turkish 
respondents, and that the results from this survey question are tentative) (Tomova, 1991:77-88).  
 
In the face of such popular distrust towards the Turkish and other Muslim minorities and a 
national identity crisis instigating a nationalist backlash, the eruption of a violent ethnic conflict 
might have appeared inevitable in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the initial conflict was remedied 
through democratic ethnopluralist political management, with emphasis on negotiation, 
compromise and the provision of political space for representation of Turkish and other Muslim 
minorities’ interests (MRF). These developments, brought to the fore the need to resolve the 
country’s ‘nationness’ problem and to gradually reformulate Bulgarian identity in a more tolerant 
direction. The ethno-nationalist rapprochement was achieved due to: 1) elite electoral interests 
and the weakness of nationalist parties and their inability to institutionalize their agenda; 2) the 
evolution of the MRF from an ethno-religious based party to a centrists and more broad based 
party; 3) external European human rights influences; and 4) gradual reconciliation of group 
differences and attitudes towards the ‘other’ (Ragaru, 2001:300-301; Anagnostou, 2005:98-101).  
 
4. An aborted ethnic conflict 
The ethno-nationalist protests that erupted in the period of transition and the rise of extreme right 
parties in Bulgaria, such as the BNRP and the FPL, threatened the political stability in the 
country. The fact that this threat did not materialize was due to four important occurrences. First, 
it was the weakness of nationalist parties and their inability to institutionalize politically their 
demands (Ragaru, 2001: 301-302). Second, it was also the creation of a party integrating the 
interests of the Turkish and other Muslim minorities – the MRF, and its evolution into a centrist 
and broad-based party. In addition, the almost tied electoral competition for government between 
the United Democratic Forces (UDF) and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) required the 
support of the MRF for the formation of a coalition government. The MRF became a balancing 
actor and a third political force in Bulgarian politics (Vasilev, 2002:113-121). The third 
facilitating factor was the internal liberal support for minority rights, along with external human 
rights influences from the Council of Europe (Anagnostou, 2005:98-101). Fourth, the gradual 
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positive evolution of societal attitudes towards Turkish and other Muslim minorities also played a 
constructive role in remedying ethnic tensions. 
 
4.1 The weakness of nationalist parties and their inability to institutionalize their agenda 
Regardless of the low voter turnout in support of nationalist parties in the early 1990s, popular 
attitudes towards the Muslim ethno-religious minorities were such that they threatened to frustrate 
the democratization process. One of the reasons for the initial inability of the nationalists to make 
a stronger case and to institutionalize their agenda was the lack of financial resources available to 
nationalist parties, the appropriation of their argument by the two largest political parties – the 
BSP and the UDF, and the fact that the majority of Bulgarians were mostly concerned about their 
economic interests (Neuburger, 1997:12-13). The nationalist parties that emerged in the political 
spectrum were inexperienced and lacked financial resources. The only party capable of asserting 
itself on the political scene was the BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party – composed of reform 
communists), which possessed enough funds and political experience. Nationalist parties were 
financially unstable and politically inexperienced, and the nationalist protests that they often 
mobilized in the early 1990s became not only outlets for the expression of anti-Turkish 
sentiments, but also for the expression of general public dissatisfaction with the political and 
economic situation in the country. Among the people that took part in these demonstrations, and 
comprised the nationalist public were Communist Party elites, former participants in the ‘Rebirth 
Process,’ illegally occupying property of Turks who fled the country during communist rule, and 
“non-elite” ethnic Bulgarians in regions with mixed populations (blaming Turks who left the 
country in 1989 for their region’s economic crisis). Former supporters of the so called “Rebirth 
Process,” feared persecution for their past actions, and faced eviction as of property restitution to 
former Turkish owners. These elements adopted an ethno- nationalist stance and took part in the 
nationalist protests. They “had economic and symbolic interests vested in preserving the status 
quo created by the assimilatory policies of the previous regime” (Stamatov, 2000:559; RFE/RL 9 
February, 1990:9). As soon as it became evident that there would be no trial and persecution of 
former participants in the ‘Rebirth Process’, this group of protesters withdrew from nationalist 
organizations and demonstrations (Stamatov, 2000:557-560; Creed,1990: 4-5).  
 
The adoption of nationalist rhetoric by other broad-based parties such as the two major competing 
forces – the Bulgarian Socialist Party and the United Democratic Forces – also weakened the 
support for nationalist parties. In the beginning of the transition period, the political spectrum in 
Bulgaria became increasingly polarized between the BSP and the UDF, each struggling to 
monopolize power. Despite the former communist’s public denunciation of the “Rebirth 
Process”, the Bulgarian Socialist Party and its supporters still remained divided on the country’s 
national question. Depending on the political climate around elections, the Bulgarian Socialists 
used from time to time nationalist rhetoric. In the first general elections held in 1990, the Socialist 
government at the time refrained from using nationalist rhetoric in its campaigns and did not 
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oppose the registration of the MRF (with a platform based on the assurance of human rights to all 
minorities), despite the Constitutional ban on formation of ethnic-based and religious parties. The 
participation of the MRF in the elections was beneficial for the Socialist government, based on 
the expectation that the MRF would divert votes away from the UDF (democratic opposition). 
This strategy brought about the Socialists’ electoral victory. The absence of xenophobic rhetoric 
in their campaign was a tactic to secure their positive international standing (which was needed 
due to a past record of human rights abuses) and to avoid a politically destabilizing domestic 
atmosphere (Ragaru, 2001:302-303). In addition, the 1990 elections gave rise to the MRF as a 
third political force in Bulgarian politics, obtaining 23 seats in Parliament (3 seats occupied by 
ethnic Bulgarian MRF MPs) (http://www.dps.bg/?pit=8&it=33; Eminov, 1999:36). 
        
However, following a sudden political turmoil against the government due to a deteriorating 
social and economic situation in the country, resulting in a call for new elections in 1991, led to a 
shift in the usage of anti-Turkish rhetoric in the BSP’s political campaigns. As the climate was 
more conducive to victory for the more democratic and reform oriented UDF, the BSP 
appropriated the nationalist parties’ xenophobic rhetoric. This move was instrumental in 
weakening the nationalist parties and destroying their platform. In 1991, anti-Turkish rhetoric 
was widely used, and the consequences of this proved to be damaging for the BSP. The BSP lost 
the elections due to their unpopular anti-Turk and anti-reform program. The UDF’s positive 
democratic, inclusive and reform-oriented platform proved more appealing to voters. The UDF 
won the elections with a narrow victory of 110 seats to 106 BSP seats in Parliament, and the 
MRF obtained 10% of the vote and 24 seats in Parliament (Eminov, 1999:37; Neuburger, 
1997:10; Ragaru, 2000:303-304). Although nationalist parties did not garner enough votes to 
obtain seats in Parliament, they remained vocal opponents to the new MRF-UDF coalition 
government The nationalist parties’ media outlets, such as the Bulgarian Liberal Democratic 
Party’s journal Zora (Dawn) and the Bulgarian National Radical Party’s newspaper Bulgarski 
Glas (Bulgarian Voice), were full of articles and illustrations that pledged to defend everything 
Bulgarian, and protested against ‘historical injustices.’ In addition, the government’s 
‘foreignness’ was emphasized, by ‘selling out’ the Bulgarian nation to Western and Turkish 
interests. The President Zhelyu Zhelev (UDF) was called “a Marxist with a turban on his head” 
who was:  
 
 “…yesterday’s red tulip proletariat-internationalist who quickly transferred to the 
[political camp] of the cosmopolitan Euro-American political butterflies, who flit from 
capital to capital in Western Europe and America…waiting for belittling praise from their 
powerful masters” (Dimitrov, 1993:36) 
 
In sync with attacks on the UDF, were also such against the MRF. The MRF was represented in 
the nationalist media as an illegal political party, violating the constitutional and territorial 
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principles of the country, and pressing for much resented education in the Turkish language. An 
article in the journal Zora went as far as to accuse Ahmed ‘Doganov’ of trying to Turkify 
Bulgaria, and mocked Bulgarians of: 
  
 “…vot[ing] for their own Turkification...[where] …the flying carpet of Ahmed Doganov 
will take [everyone] to the Anatolian Mosques and Minarets…[and concluded 
that]…Yesteday’s terrorist doesn’t learn democracy” (Ibid:39) 
 
After losing the elections, the BSP also continued to spread anti-Turkish rhetoric. In their 
newspaper Misul (Thought) they argued that Turks in Bulgaria were not national, but a religious 
minority, who were forcibly Turkified during Ottoman rule. The Socialists argued that the MRF 
was a reminder of the Turkish yoke (Ibid: 47). Following year in power, the UDF government 
collapsed in 1992, and two years of BSP- MRF coalition government followed.  
 
The early 1990s witnessed a period of continuous political party re-configurations with frequent 
change in governments. Between 1991 and 1994, the MRF played a balancing role in Bulgarian 
politics, allying either with the UDF or the BSP in government (See Appendix, Figure: 11). Anti-
Turkish rhetoric was used selectively by both the BSP and the UDF, depending on the MRF’s 
alliance preferences. Resorting to xenophobic rhetoric became a standard act in Bulgarian 
politics, shifting with the political wind through the years as a part in the electoral platforms of 
broad-based parties. This factor weakened nationalist parties and their influence in Bulgarian 
politics during the transition period. Ethnic exclusive nationalism was not historically entrenched 
in Bulgarian politics and social space, and it was less pronounced in comparison to civic and 
cultural nationalism. Ethno-national rhetoric did not materialize, but was utilized by political 
elites as a defensive mechanism in times of political uncertainties, power struggles and economic 
crises (Creed, 1990:3). The formation of the MRF, and the broadening of its agenda to support 
not only minority human rights, but also the rights of all Bulgarian citizens, its moderate stance 
rejecting extremism, separatism and Turkish nationalism, as well as its balancing partisan role, 
have all proved to be constructive elements in Bulgaria’s transition to democracy. The moderate 
platform of the party and its reform-oriented democratic program, proved to be beneficial for the 
elevation of nationalist tensions, facilitating tolerance in Bulgarian society and a relatively 
smooth democratic transition (Vasilev, 2002: 114-116).  
 
4.2 The evolution of the MRF as a broad-based ‘third political force’. 
The evolution of the MRF from an exclusively minority to a centrist and broad- based party, 
resulted in the moderation of extreme nationalist sentiments and rhetoric targeting the Turkish 
and other Muslim minorities. The MRF’s adoption of a moderate platform has led to the party’s 
acceptance in Bulgarian social and political space. The predecessor to the MRF was the 
underground Turkish National Liberation Organization in Bulgaria (TNLOB) with leader Ahmed 
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Dogan, which was founded in 1985, in opposition to the communist assimilation campaign. The 
main function of the organization was non-violent political dissent, in opposition to the 
Communist Party’s curtailment of Muslim and Turkish minorities’ rights and freedoms. In 1986, 
the organization was dismantled by the government’s secret services, and its members and 
leadership were imprisoned or sent to forced labor camps. Ahmed Dogan was jailed based on 
allegations of attempted murder of the son of Todor Zhivkov and the daughter of Pencho 
Kubadinski.  During Ahmed Dogan’s imprisonment, he maintained the work of his organization, 
and continued to oppose the repressive policies of the regime. In 1989, he held several hunger 
strikes in prison in protest to the regime’s policies, and demanded the following from the 
Bulgarian government: 
 
“ 1)Amnesty for political prisoners opposed to the “Rebirth Process” 2) restoration of 
Turkish names 3) the passing of a law in Parliament guaranteeing people the right to speak 
freely in public their national minority language, including Turkish 4) freedom of creed 5) 
freedom to emigrate to Turkey” (TNLOB: http://ww.dps.bg/?pit=8&it=32 ).  
 
In sum, the aim of the TNLOB, by means of peaceful demonstration, demanded the restoration of 
rights and freedoms to Bulgaria’s Muslim population, and did not seek the territorial partition of 
the country. The absence of support for territorial partition is reflected in a police statement from 
January 21, 1989, where the leader Ahmed Dogan declared that “…he denies claims for territorial 
autonomy, and he is opposed to the territorial partition of Bulgaria” 
(http://ww.dps.bg/?pit=8&it=32). The fate of the TNLOB and the May 1989 demonstrations of 
the Muslim population against the regime’s violation of human rights attracted international 
attention (http://ww.dps.bg/?pit=8&it=32 ).Following the disintegration of the communist regime, 
in December, 1989 Ahmed Dogan was granted amnesty and released from prison. 
 
In December, 1990, the MRF was launched as an organization, with policy of continuity from the 
TNLOB, defending the rights and freedoms of Turkish and other Muslim minorities. In April 26, 
1990 the party was officially registered in the Sofia district court, with a leader Ahmed Dogan 
(http://www.dps.bg/?pit=8&it=33). Prior to the party’s constitutional status challenge by the 
nationalists, the MRF demanded “the legal protection of the Muslim community in conformity 
with international standards, political and civil rights, and guarantees for its ethnic, cultural, 
religious and linguistic identity” (Vasilev, 2002: 113). The leader of the MRF, Ahmed Dogan was 
vocal in insisting for the protection of collective minority rights and cultural autonomy, but never 
expressed any demands for political or territorial autonomy, or advocated the use of violence. For 
instance, the MRF maintains in its platform the importance of “a united and democratic Bulgaria” 
and “denounces all forms of separatism, fundamentalism and fanaticism”. The MRF is opposed to 
“totalitarianism and extremism on the political left or right” (http://www.dps.bg/?pit=8&it=33). 
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Ahmed Dogan is also against the use of violence as a means to achieving political ends. This 
objective is reflected in one of his statements:  
 
“I am against any forms of violence. None of my strategies that I built for myself and 
others involve violence. In my opinion, a person who utilizes the ‘spillage of blood’ as a 
means to achieving a particular end, has to distance himself/herself from the social, 
political or business processes. I am not a person who insists on achieving a goal by 
utilizing all possible means. The notion of utilizing ‘all possible means’ to achieving a 
desired end, suggests that the end justifies the means. I do not accept such a formula, which 
for me is a principle of nationalism, whether it is expressed by Hitler or Lenin, it doesn’t 
matter. From such a formula, one can draw monstrous principles” 
(http://www.dps.bg/?pit=8&it=33 ) 
 
The MRF distanced itself (and still maintains such a distance) from the separatist nationalist 
Turkish Democratic Party of Adem Kenan (established in 1990, but banned from registration), 
which advocates the creation of a federal state in Bulgaria with equal status for Bulgarians and 
Turks (Vasilev, 2002: 114-115). In addition, Kenan does not recognize the Bulgarian 
Constitution. For example, when interviewed by several Bulgarian newspapers such as 24 chasa 
(24 hours) and Douma in 1999, Kenan stated that “the entire Constitution of the Republic of 
Bulgaria must be rewritten”. He argued that Bulgarians are a minority in Bulgaria, citing dubious 
statistics claiming that Muslims constitute 40% of Bulgaria’s population, and Christians 60%, of 
whom only 20% are Bulgarian. Based on these figures Kenan stated that the Turkish language 
should become official and that “autonomy should be sought for all municipalities with compact 
Turkish population” (i.e. Southern and Northeastern Bulgaria) (May 10, 1999: http://www.b-
info.com/tools/miva/newsview.mv?url=places/Bulgaria/news/99-05/may10d.bta ).   
 
In contrast to such positions, the MRF maintains a moderate and inclusive agenda. The MRF’s 
policies transformed from a narrow focus on collective minority rights to addressing broader 
issues such as economic development and human rights for all Bulgarians. In 1991-1994, MRF’s 
political platform evolved from a somewhat isolationist and confrontational one emphasizing a 
“wounded collective memory” from the “Rebirth Process,” to a more universal one claiming to be 
representative of the nation’s values. (Zhelyaskova, 2001: 297-298). For example, atricle 1 of the 
MRF’s Statute, stipulates that “the Movement for Rights and Freedoms is an independent socio-
political organization, founded to contribute to the unity of all Bulgarian citizens, by respecting 
the rights and freedoms of Bulgaria’s minorities – in accordance with the Constitution and laws 
of the country, the International Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities and other international treaties” (http://www.dps.bg/?it=24&pit=7). The party 
maintains that its platform is “…founded on liberal principles, aiming for the protection of the 
40 
 
rights and freedoms of the person and the protection of minorities” 
(http://www.dps.bg/?it=25&pit=7 ). Membership and political representation positions are open 
to all Bulgarians, regardless of their ethnic origin. In fact, over the course of the years, the party 
has had several ethnic Bulgarian regional political representatives. Overall, the MRF’s program 
aims to establish guarantees against any forms of discrimination, advocates political cooperation 
with all parties and participation in coalitions, equal regional economic development and so on. 
In sum, the MRF transformed from a party representative exclusively of Turkish and Muslim 
minorities’ interests, to a more broad-based, centrist actor, supportive of the interests of all 
Bulgarian citizens, including minorities. This transformation was instrumental in permitting the 
legal existence of the party (refer to conflict over article 11.4 of the Constitution), and in 
becoming a balancing actor in Bulgarian politics gaining concessions for the country’s minorities 
(1990-1994).  
 
The electoral system adopted in 1990 was a mix of proportional representation and a majoritarian 
system, isolating small parties (especially nationalist parties) that could not pass the 4% threshold 
and stimulated the formation of electoral coalitions. The two major competitors for complete 
political control that emerged in Bulgaria’s political space in 1990 were the BSP and the UDF 
(Tanev, 2001:238). The MRF emerged as the third political force in Bulgarian politics, creating a 
balance between the UDF and BSP. The MRF found itself in a decisive position in Bulgarian 
politics as a centrist party, possessing a considerable amount of bargaining power, especially 
between 1991 and 1994. The two opposing political forces had to tone down their anti-Turkish 
rhetoric, in order to gain the MRF on their side. An alliance with the MRF was important for both 
the UDF and the BSP, from the point of view of winning elections and staying in government. 
Being in the position of a third major political force, the MRF had stronger bargaining power in 
terms of demanding the protection of Turkish/Muslim minorities’ rights (Ragaru, 2001:305).  
 
In 1991, although not having opportunity to participate in government due to the uncertainty and 
turmoil over the Turkish question, the MRF sided with the UDF in an informal alliance with the 
motivation to remove the Socialists from power and to punish those responsible for human rights 
crimes during the assimilation campaign. This informal alliance, based on a common anti-
communist stance, helped the UDF to stay in power for one year, and on the other hand caused 
the Socialists to side with nationalist parties and adopt anti-Turkish rhetoric. The UDF-MRF 
alliance broke down in October 1992 as the UDF refused to acknowledge MRF’s social and 
economic policy concerns. The reason for the split was the UDF’s adoption of a neo-liberal 
economic policy of crash marketization, privatization and liberalization, the effects of which 
impoverished the Bulgarian people in general and Muslims in particular. This policy could not 
address effectively the problem of unequal regional economic development. Ahmed Dogan was 
in support of a more socially oriented economic reform program that would address the 
development of economically stagnant regions, where as the UDF was in opposition to such 
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program (Todorova, 1993:177-178; Andreev, 1996:35-36). Some of these economically 
underdeveloped regions included Muslim populated areas in Northeastern and Southern Bulgaria. 
The impact of the economic crisis was more severe in these regions than in any other in the 
country. Many Muslims in the Rhodoppes were dependent on the tobacco production industry, 
which since the implementation of economic reforms suffered due to loss of former Soviet and 
East European markets and fall in commodity prices. Others in the North, mainly agricultural 
producers, suffered from the dissolution of cooperatives. Unemployment in the Muslim populated 
areas was 3 to 4 times higher than the national average rate of 16%. The unemployment rate 
among Turks and Pomaks approximated to about 40% and among Roma to 80% (Kostova, 
2000:23). In fact, the results from a sociological study conducted in 1991 show that in 
comparison to other issues, most of the respondents were concerned with the country’s 
deteriorating economic situation. Among the interviewed, 56% were distressed with the country’s 
economic crisis, and saw this to be their major problem. Political problems stood second, with 
14% of the respondents expressing concern, followed by problems of loyalty, religion and 
ethnicity (Galabov, 1993:49). 
 
In sum, the split between the UDF and the MRF was based on differences over economic policy 
and its negative effects on society rather than ethnicity.  Bulgarian citizens were more concerned 
with the country’s economic crisis and its negative effect on their lives, rather than the ethnic 
situation in the country. The MRF broadened its platform to include issues not only related to 
human rights, religion and culture, but also to the social and economic well-being of its 
constituency and of Bulgarian society as a whole. 
 
In 1992, with the withdrawal of the MRF from its alliance with the UDF, and the passing of an 
MRF-BSP vote of non-confidence, led to the collapse of the UDF government. The same year, 
the MRF allied with the BSP and some elements from the UDF to form a new government, and 
helped the BSP to sustain itself in power until 1994. During this change in government, the MRF 
played an important role in proposing a candidate to become the new Prime Minister and head the 
new government – the politically unaffiliated academician Prof. Lyuben Berov 
(AL/BGR/93.001:V). In addition, the MRF’s pursuit of an alliance with the BSP was a positive 
move, resulting in the moderation of the BSP’s anti-Turkish stance. As Vasilev (2002) observes, 
in this period “strictly partisan considerations - primarily in the form of an intense political 
conflict between the UDF and the BSP, which led the reins of government to be entrusted to a 
neutral third party – appear to have been more salient than ethnic divisions and enmities” (p.122). 
The constant competition for power between the BSP (the reds) and the UDF (the blues) was 
more intense than ethnic hatred. The MRF played an important balancing role by preventing 
either party of monopolizing power, and contributed to policy moderation in this bi-partisan 
environment leaning either to the left or to the right. The MRF accomplished its incorporation 
into democratic politics, adopted a moderate and broad-based platform and improved its 
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interaction with other parties. Other parties officially recognized the MRF as an equal partner on 
the political scene, and even the nationalists arrived to the realization that the MRF was not a 
disloyal political player. During the 1997 Parliamentary elections the nationalist anti-Turkish 
rhetoric was moderated, and the MRF formed a coalition incorporating left, left-centrist, centrist 
and monarchist parties under the name Union of National Salvation, supported by the former 
King Simeon II, against the BSP and the UDF. During the June 2001 elections, the MRF received 
7.5% of the votes and 21 seats in Parliament, and the National Movement of Simeon II won an 
unexpected victory. The MRF and the National Movement of Simeon II created a government 
coalition, which proved to be constructive for Bulgaria’s ethnic relations (See Appendix, Figure 
12) (Ibid: 122-123).  
 
In sum, the party alliances that emerged in the initial period of transition and the important 
balancing role that the MRF played at this time, along with the evolution of the party’s concerns 
from more isolationist and minority-oriented politics to broad-based and inclusive politics proved 
to be beneficial for Bulgaria’s ethnic relations. The incorporation of the MRF in parliamentary 
institutions and local government was instrumental in channeling minority concerns to the 
political process. The compromise on Bulgaria’s national question was reached through 
democratic ethnopluralist means in the political space. Thus, ethnopluralist politics such as 
political party re-configurations, negotiation and compromise, along with the role, evolution and 
integration of the MRF, played a decisive part in alleviating ethnic animosities. Other important 
factors working in this direction were internal liberal elite support and external influences, as well 
as the evolution of societal attitudes towards the foreign ‘other.’ 
 
 
4.3 Influence of the European Integration Process: 
The roles of European institutions along with internal liberal support from the UDF were 
instrumental in stimulating the recognition of minority rights in Bulgarian politics. In 1991 
Bulgaria submitted an application for membership to Council of Europe. During the evaluation 
process, the Council expressed their disapproval over the Constitutional ban on the formation of 
ethnic parties, which limited minorities’ opportunities for representation and expression of their 
concerns over issues such as cultural, religious and educational rights. In addition, Bulgarian 
liberals in the UDF equally sought the opportunity to join European institutions and confirmed 
the necessity of the practical application of guarantees of minority political, cultural and religious 
rights. Liberal-oriented elites, some of which were the former Presidents Zhelyu Zhelev and Petar 
Stojanov, publicly denounced the ‘Rebirth Process’ and other past violations on Muslim 
minorities’ rights, initiated respect for human rights, and worked in the direction of meeting EU 
reform requirements to facilitate the country’s future integration (Anagnostou, 2005: 100-102). 
 
43 
 
In March 1993, Bulgaria signed an Association Agreement with the European Union that came 
into effect in January1995. In December 2002, at the Copenhagen European Council, the EU 
announced the membership acceptance date for Bulgaria in the European Union – 2007 
(Giatzidis, 2004:434-441). In the 1990s, the Bulgarian government debated on and signed several 
European Conventions. The goal of EU integration pressed politicians to revise and condemn 
former human rights violations against minority groups. The EU accession process has called for 
the adoption of legal provisions by the Bulgarian government for the protection of minority 
rights. Bulgaria ratified the European Convention on Human Rights on May 7, 1992. A National 
Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues was also set up in 1997, to address minorities’ 
concerns (Maeva: 3-4). While raising considerable public and Parliamentary debates on the 
definition of “minority” and its legal consistency with the Bulgarian Constitution, the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was ratified in 1999. Based on further EU 
requirements, Parliament voted in 2003 to implement the Protection from Discrimination Act 
(2003) (Kostova: 18-19; Maeva: 4).   
 
Although the ratification of EU Conventions and their incorporation into Bulgaria’s domestic 
legal framework was a positive step in terms of providing legal guarantees for minority rights and 
non-discrimination, their practical implementation to present remains ambiguous. On the one 
hand, following intense Parliamentary debates and social discontent, considerable government 
efforts were made to advance education and media broadcasting in the Turkish language. In 
1991-1994, the Bulgarian government issued and implemented a decree permitting voluntary 
education in Turkish from grades 1-8. An Islamic College and four secondary Islamic schools 
were founded in the country. Media publications in Turkish, and as of 2001 news broadcasting in 
Turkish began on the Bulgarian National Television and Bulgarian National Radio “Hristo 
Botev” (Maeva:2-3). On the other hand, a level of discrimination persists against ethnic minority 
groups, especially the Roma.  For example, an Amnesty International news report, lists some 
incidents of violence against Roma, one of them conducted by police officials:  
• “On 30 April, Georgi Angelov was reportedly brutally beaten by two men who cut off 
his ear with a razor blade. This and similar incidents were reportedly not effectively 
investigated. Local human rights organizations have called for better policing in 
Romani neighbourhoods and known meeting-places of skinheads.  
• On 16 January Assen Zarev from the Fakulteta neighbourhood in the capital was 
reportedly beaten by police officers near his house who threatened to shoot him if he 
did not give information about the whereabouts of some men suspected of cutting 
down a tree in the near-by woods. Assen Zarev later obtained a forensic medical 
certificate, describing injuries consistent with the allegations of ill-treatment.  
(http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGEUR010012005 ) 
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A 1999 Report on Bulgaria from the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance/ 
Council of Europe, recognizes that the most vulnerable minority group in Bulgaria is the Roma. 
In regards to the Turkish minority, the Report stipulates that their situation has considerably 
improved, although discrimination remains in terms of employment opportunities and military 
recruitment placements, restricted to the construction corps (note: Turks, Pomaks and Roma 
soldiers have traditionally been isolated by the military  in the construction corps). In terms of 
religion, the Report states that tolerance exists towards individuals belonging to the three 
traditional confessional groups – Judaism, Christianity and Islam, but discrimination persists 
towards non-traditional religious denominations such as for instance Jehova’s Witnesses 
(http://www.coe.int/T/e/human_rights/ecri/5-Archives/1-ECRI's_work/5-
CBC_Second_reports/Bulgaria_CBC_2.asp) .  
 
Most international laws and conventions can only provide legal guidelines for the desirable 
treatment of minorities, but lack an enforcement mechanism to ensure their practical application. 
Many states with human rights violation problems hide behind the principle of national 
sovereignty, and the only method to ensure compliance with international UN and EU 
conventions for the protection of minorities is by blaming and shaming perpetrators or imposing 
economic sanctions. Legal provisions may set the groundwork for group rapprochement, but real 
change in terms of treatment and toleration of national minorities can only come from within 
society. Education, intra-cultural dialogue and exchange can facilitate the gradual eradication of 
prejudice towards the ‘other’.  
 
4.4 Gradual evolution of societal attitudes towards the ethnic ‘other’: 
Although prejudice against the Turkish and other Muslim minorities (especially Roma) minorities 
still exists among ethnic Bulgarians, and some acts of violence committed by the public or police 
based on ethnicity still take place, there has been an important trend towards the weakening of 
these prejudices and recognition that human beings are equal regardless race, creed, gender or 
social status. Considerable efforts have been pursued by society, intellectuals and non-
governmental organizations with a focus on human rights such as the Bulgarian Helsinki 
Committee (Bulgarski helzinski komitet, BHK), the Bulgarian Lawyers for Human Rights 
(Bulgarski advokati za pravata na choveka), the Human Rights Project (Proekt Prava na 
choveka) and Tolerance Foundation (Fondacija Tolerantnost) to counter these trends. Attitudes 
towards minorities have been evolving in a positive direction, although at a considerably slow 
pace. The roles of non-governmental organizations in addressing the issue have varied from focus 
on human rights, to the stimulation of intra-ethnic dialogue through cultural events or symposia. 
Efforts of human-rights based non-governmental organizations have focused on naming and 
shaming perpetrators, and submitting reports documenting police brutality against minorities to 
the European Court on Human Rights (Ivanov&Ilieva, 2005:22). Other non-governmental 
organizations, the most prominent being Guven and the International Centre for Minority Studies, 
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are inter-ethnic mission based, committed to resolving disputes and improving relations among 
various ethnic groups. Rapprochement is pursued via educational and cultural projects, such as 
the provision of education grants, organization of language classes and seminars, conduction of 
research, or staging exhibitions and cultural performances to preserve and popularize a particular 
culture (Snavely & Chakarova, 1997:317-324). 
 
As previously mentioned, in Bulgaria, there is more religious-based rather than ethnic based 
tolerance. Mutual religious tolerance is evident among Christians and Muslims, and intolerance 
persists more so against new religious denominations such as Evangelics or Protestants. Insults 
tend not to be religious-based such as “As bad as a Muslim”, but rather ethnic-based, such as “As 
bad as a Turk”, “As dirty and dishonest as a Gypsy”, and “as wild as a Bulgarian” (Zhelyaskova, 
2001: 298). According to opinion polls, negative attitudes towards the Turks and other Muslims 
in Bulgarian society have been decreasing. For example, 84% of ethnic Bulgarians in 1992 
compared to 72% in 1994 and 63% in 1997 claimed that “Bulgarian Turks are religious fanatics”, 
and 84% in 1992, 72% in 1994, and 46% in 1997 believed that “ethnic Turks can not be trusted 
or relied upon”; 84% in 1992, 55% in 1994, and 37% in 1997 agreed that “ethnic Turks are 
hostile towards Bulgarians” and 37% in 1992, 6% in 1994, and 29% in 1997 responded to the 
claim that “Everything possible should be done to make more Turks emigrate to Turkey” 
(Ivanov&Ilieva,2005:23). The issues on which ethnic Bulgarians have expressed the greatest 
discontent are public school education and news broadcasting in the Turkish language. 
Nevertheless, reflecting on the results from these polls, it seems that Bulgarians’ ethnic-based 
prejudices are gradually disappearing over the years. 
 
Furthermore, the fear and distrust towards the Muslim or Turkish ‘other’, has been gradually 
eroding. As Zhelyaskova (2001) observes “otherness is perceived calmly as ‘a familiar 
strangeness and not as something completely unknown and therefore threatening” (p.300). Ethnic 
and religious co-existence in Bulgaria and mutual processes of interaction and communication 
gradually eliminate rigid boundaries of ‘us versus them’.  Ethno-religious perceptions towards the 
‘other’ evolve into “familiar strangeness” followed by the subsequent realization of the value of 
the human being regardless of ethnic origin or religious affiliation. A sociological study – 
“Changes in Ethnic Perceptions among Students” (Promjana na Etnicheskite Obrazi i 
Uchenicheskoto Vuzprijatie) conducted in 1992 with 212 students (124 Turks, 84 Bulgarians, 1 
Roma, 1 ‘Turkish Roma’, 2 unidentified women) in an ethnically mixed region (Isperih), 
confirms these reconciliatory trends. Although the results are limited to one region, they still 
contain valuable information on ethnic relations. In terms of knowledge about religious holidays 
and their significance, 1 out of 6 of the Christian respondents were familiar with Muslim holidays 
and their importance. Among the Muslim students, every second participant had knowledge about 
various Christian holidays. Overall, the respondents articulated through their responses a tolerant 
attitude towards the other’s religious group (Germanova, 1992:138-139).  
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In terms of lifestyle, 50% of the Turkish respondents did not see a difference between the Turkish 
and Bulgarian housing arrangements, and Bulgarian respondents saw only some differences, most 
noticeable being (87%) the wearing of shalvari by older Muslim women. House visitations 
between the two groups were quite common, where 71.4% of the Bulgarian and 71.8% of the 
Turkish students visited one another during holidays or without any reason, because they were 
neighbors and friends. One interesting response provided by a Bulgarian girl was that “Turks and 
Bulgarians do not hate one another that much, and after all we are all human beings. Therefore, if 
you are friends with a Turkish family you can go and visit them whenever you want”. In terms of 
general perceptions about the other ethnic group, both Bulgarians and Turks overestimated their 
own group in comparison to the other. The Turks saw themselves as good, patient, hard working, 
understanding, but yet poor and confused. The Bulgarians self-evaluated themselves as good, 
hospitable and persistent people, but also as “Bai-Ganiovci”, lazy and anti-social. The most 
negative attitude was expressed against the Roma, among 62% of the Bulgarian and 52% of the 
Turkish respondents (Roma were seen as liars, robbers, always ‘seeking to pull a deal’) (Ibid: 
139-141).  
 
While the Bulgarian students had some positive evaluation about themselves, interestingly 
enough, they also had the negative self-Orientalizing perception of resembling the literary figure 
Bai-Ganio (uncle Ganio), the main character of a popular classic 19th century novel Bai-Ganio: 
Incredible Tales about a Contemporary Bulgarian, by the Bulgarian writer and political 
pamphleteer Aleko Konstantinov. In Konstantinov’s novel, Bai-Ganio Balkanski is an itinerant 
trader of rose oil and rugs, who travels across Western Europe. Due to his inadequate actions (i.e. 
shouting, pinching a waitress, talking out loud and blowing his nose in the Vienna Opera during a 
performance; spitting on the carpet in the house of his host; acting foolish so others would pay his 
bills), the character gets involved in absurd situations, which clash with what are considered to be 
civilized manners and values, and are even resented by his compatriots (students or intellectuals) 
that he encounters during his trips (Daskalov, 2001:530-531). Bai-Ganjo is a character that 
reveals the problems within Bulgarian society, a humorous image of the ‘unscrupulous and vulgar 
self’ clashing with the lifestyle and mannerisms of the civilized European figure. Although 
certainly not meant to be a signifier of every Bulgarian, the figure of Bai Ganjo “serves as a test 
to tease out and reveal some of the basic configurations and fundamental problems of modern 
Bulgarian society” (Ibid: 548). As Neuburger (1997) notes “…in Bulgaria’s own struggle with 
democracy and economic transition the self-Orientalizing, self-depreciating figure of Bai Ganjo 
has also re-emerged…as the internal foe to national development” (p.15) (See Appendix, Figure 
13). The average Bulgarian’s encounters with problems of the ‘self’ distract the focus on the 
ethnic ‘other.’ All Bulgarian citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin or religious affiliation 
struggle through the same daily problems of economic underdevelopment, political instability, 
crime and corruption.  
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In sum, although ethnic-based violence and discrimination still take place in Bulgarian society, 
there is evidence that efforts are being made in the direction to gradually eradicate intolerant 
behavior through the activities of the non-governmental sector, with a focus on human rights and 
intra-ethnic rapprochement. The necessity of the average Bulgarian to deal with the “Bai 
Ganiovshtina” from within, have re-directed the focus from the ethnic ‘other.’ Most Bulgarians 
have gradually raised civic values of nationhood, maintained a level of cultural nationalism, and 
have to a certain extent set aside divisive ethno-nationalist tendencies.   
 
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to deconstruct simplistic accounts placing Eastern European countries 
under the common denominator of being ethnically divisive societies plagued by historically 
entrenched primordial divisions, which were supposedly ‘frozen’ by communism and rose to the 
surface following the fall of the Iron Curtain. It has been established that nationalism may adopt 
various forms. The most pronounced form of nationalism in a state is often influenced by 
political, economic and social realities. The prevalence of ethnic nationalism in a state as was in 
the case of Bulgaria varied throughout history, and was not a historically or geographically fixed 
feature. There were various forms of nationalism throughout the history of Bulgaria. Nationalism 
was an anti-imperial and romantic prior to liberation from Ottoman rule (1878), and then 
transformed to irredentist, aiming to united territories populated by fellow nationals to the 
Bulgarian state, followed by revanchist/defensive ethno-cultural forms after defeat in the Second 
Balkan War (1913) and two World Wars, cultural during communism (1944-1989), and civic, 
ethnic and cultural during the transition period (1989-present). The prevalence of some forms of 
nationalism over others were influenced by changes in the international conjuncture, wars, 
domestic politics and ideological currents, relations with Turkey, economics and social realities. 
These nationalist variants and influences had an impact on the treatment of the Bulgarian state 
towards its Muslim population, ranging from passive tolerance or neglect to the implementation 
of assimilatory campaigns (1912-1913; 1930-1940; 1956-1989).  
 
Following the disintegration of the Bulgarian communist regime in 1989, Bulgaria witnessed the 
escalation of ethnic tensions between its Muslim minority population and ethnic Bulgarian 
majority (1989-1991).  Despite expectations on the contrary, the ‘ticking time bomb of ethnic 
conflict’ did not explode after the collapse of the communist regime, and ethnic differences were 
channeled for mediation in the political and social space without resorting to violence. This was 
achieved through democratic ethno-pluralism, which was constructive to fostering civic unity 
while providing safeguards for ethnic minorities’ rights and freedoms for expression in education, 
politics (MRF) and the media. Most people were concerned with eliminating the possibility of the 
coming to power of another authoritarian government, rather than with the issue of the MRF’s 
existence and participation in the political process. Anti-Turkish and anti-Muslim rhetoric was 
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used by various political actors in times of economic instability and political competition for 
government office. Representatives from different ethnic, political, social and religious groups 
were able to unite around a common civic identity, and pulled together to negotiate and reach a 
compromise on Bulgaria’s national question. Various factors were constructive to fostering ethnic 
peace in the country such as: 1.) the weakness of nationalist parties and their inability to 
institutionalize their platform 2.) the evolution of the MRF from a minority party to a centrist 
broad-based actor , which was able to maintain the balance of power between the BSP and the 
UDF 3.) influences of the EU integration process on Bulgaria’s minority rights legislation and 
compliance and 4.) the gradual evolution of societal attitudes towards the ethnic ‘other’, and 
respect for civic values. The absence of retribution attempts by members of the Turkish and other 
Muslim communities for past injustices, and the ability of the Bulgarian government to integrate 
minority and nationalist concerns, were instrumental to the preservation of peace in the country. 
The unity of the Bulgarian state was not challenged by the Muslim population, and the 
minorities’ economic, cultural and political interests were secured. Democratic ethno-pluralist 
methods of political power-sharing, negotiation and compromise were constructive to 
accommodating diverse group concerns, including those of the nationalists, and resulted in 
remedying of ethnic tensions. Democratic ethno-pluralism also facilitated the process of gradual 
consolidation of national civic identities, while it provided space for the preservation of ethnic 
and cultural particularities.  
 
   
Appendix 
 
Figure 1: 
 
Bulgarian Medieval State 
 
49 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.purebulgaria.com/en_version/history.php  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2                                          Paisii Hilendarski 
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Figure 3                 Bulgarian household (1830-70) 
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Bulgarian men wearing hats (kalpak) and a woman wearing traditional scarf 
 
 
 
Sources: http://www.tenoresdibitti.com/bittiexp05/snimka.jpg  
 
               http://rumen123.hit.bg/rumen1.jpg  
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Figure 4                         
 
 
                                              San Stefano Bulgaria (1878) 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.purebulgaria.com/en_version/history.php 
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Figure 5 
 
 
                                                         Bulgaria after WWII 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://www.purebulgaria.com/en_version/history.php  
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Figure 6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eminov, 1997: 80  
Figure 7 
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Source : Neuburger, 2004 :93,94 
Figure 8  
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                 Pomak women in rural areas in traditional dress 
 
                         
                                   
      Pomak bride  
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A Pomak girl carrying dried tobacco leaves on her shoulders  
 
 
A Pomak man  
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Source : Kanchev K. and Hristov B. Ot Iznik Slonce do Zanih : Photolyric, Faraon Design : 1997 
Figure 9  
                             Members of the Rodina Organization  
 
               
Source : Neuburger, 2004 : 98 
 
Figure 10                Documents from the “Re-birth Process”  
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Letters addressed to Turks in Bulgaria were returned to the sender and marked 
“unknown”  
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A Turk of Bulgaria – “Georgi Dimitrov” from Kurdjali, charged with speaking Turkish 
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International Press Commentaries on the “Rebirth Process” and diaspora activism in 
Canada against the Bulgarian government’s assimilation campaign 
 
 
63 
 
 
64 
 
 
Note: All the documents and press excerpts related to the “Rebirth Process” are from the archives 
of the Canadian Association for Solidarity of Turks from Bulgaria in Toronto, which were kindly 
provided by the President of the Association – Mr. Ismail Vataner.  
 
 
Figure 11 
 
On this cartoon Ahmed Dogan is the man in the middle, between representatives from the 
BSP (right) and UDF (left); President Zhelev is bouncing a soccer ball on the side  
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Figure 12 
President Stoyanov (left), Dogan (middle) and king Simeon (right) 
 
 
 
Source: Palchev, Ivan. Ahmed Dogan: Opit za Politicheski Portret, Sofia:RIK Slaviani, 2001 
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Figure 13 
              
                             Bai Ganio’s Desires 
 
 
 
 
- Common young lady (democracy), let’s get married on the altar of the Fatherland!... 
Source: Neuburger, 1997:19 
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